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ABSTRACT
The large distributed electric power system is a hierarchical network involving the
transportation of power from the sources of power generation via an intermediate
densely connected transmission network to a large distribution network of end-users
at the lowest level of the hierarchy. At each level of the hierarchy (generation/ trans-
mission/ distribution), the system is managed and monitored with a combination of
(a) supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA); and (b) energy management
systems (EMSs) that process the collected data and make control and actuation de-
cisions using the collected data. However, at all levels of the hierarchy, both SCADA
and EMSs are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Furthermore, given the criticality of the
electric power infrastructure, cyber attacks can have severe economic and social con-
sequences.
This thesis focuses on cyber attacks on SCADA and EMS at the transmission
level of the electric power system. The goal is to study the consequences of three
classes of cyber attacks that can change topology data. These classes include: (i)
unobservable state-preserving cyber attacks that only change the topology data; (ii)
unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attacks that change both states and
topology data to enable a coordinated physical and cyber attack; and (iii) topology-
targeted man-in-the-middle (MitM) communication attacks that alter topology data
shared during inter-EMS communication. Specifically, attack class (i) and (ii) focus on
the unobservable attacks on single regional EMS while class (iii) focuses on the MitM
attacks on communication links between regional EMSs. For each class of attacks,
the theoretical attack model and the implementation of attacks are provided, and the
worst-case attack and its consequences are exhaustively studied. In particularly, for
class (ii), a two-stage optimization problem is introduced to study worst-case attacks
that can cause a physical line overflow that is unobservable in the cyber layer. The
i
long-term implication and the system anomalies are demonstrated via simulation.
For attack classes (i) and (ii), both mathematical and experimental analyses sug-
gest that these unobservable attacks can be limited or even detected with resiliency
mechanisms including load monitoring, anomalous re-dispatches checking, and his-
torical data comparison. For attack class (iii), countermeasures including anomalous
tie-line interchange verification, anomalous re-dispatch alarms, and external contin-
gency lists sharing are needed to thwart such attacks.
ii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
The large distributed electric power system is a hierarchical network involving the
transportation of power from the sources of power generation via an intermediate
densely connected transmission network to a large distribution network of end-users
at the lowest level of the hierarchy. To ensure reliable operation of the entire power
system, the system operator at each level should be aware of the real-time operation
states. Therefore, secure and intelligent cyber data processing systems that monitor
and control each level of the physical power system are crucial for reliable real-time
operations. Such a cyber layer includes (a) supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) system, and (b) energy management systems (EMSs) for data processing.
Figure 1.1 illustrates an example of the hierarchical electric power system. The figure
demonstrates how at various levels from generation through transmission, substation,
distribution, and even end-users, the network appropriate at each level is monitored
using the collected SCADA data via an EMS to enable control and actuation of the
undelaying physical system.
However, at all levels of the hierarchy, both SCADA and EMSs are vulnerable
to cyber attacks. In fact, such cyber attacks can undermine the observability of
physical systems, and hence, lead to mis-operation, violation, and inappropriate and
untimely contingency response. In addition of cyber attacks, delays and errors on
communication links between regional EMSs also reduce the global awareness of the
system. Both cyber attacks and communication errors can potentially lead to severe
1
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Figure 1.1: Hierarchical Cyber-physical Power System.
economic and social consequences.
The transmission level of electric power system is both the generation and large
scale distribution of bulk power happens and correspondingly, is the most monitored
and controlled by the cyber layer. To this end, this thesis focuses on the cyber attacks
on the transmission system. The goal is to study the consequences of three classes of
cyber attacks that can change topology data. These classes include: (i) unobservable
state-preserving cyber attacks that only change the topology data; (ii) unobservable
state-and-topology cyber-physical attacks that can change both states and topology
data to coordinate physical attacks; and (iii) topology-targeted man-in-the-middle
(MitM) communication attacks that target on limiting topology sharing on inter-area
communication. Specifically, attack class (i) and (ii) focus on the unobservable cyber
attacks in which the data changed by attacker appears like normal states and can
bypass the bad data detector on single region EMS. The attack class (iii) focuses on
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the MitM attacks on multi-regional EMSs data communication. For each class of
attacks, the theoretical attack model is presented, the implementation of attacks is
provided, and the worst-case attack and its consequences on the physical system are
exhaustively studied. In particularly, for class (ii), the goal is to study attacks that
can cause a physical line overflow that is unobservable in the cyber system via a two-
stage optimization formulation. The long-term implication of each attack class and
the system anomalies resulting from such attacks are demonstrated via simulation.
1.2 Thesis Motivation
In recent years, several incidents have shown that cyber attacks can have severe
consequences on power system. In addition, communication delays which can lead to
devastating social and economic losses can also be mimicked by cyber attacks. The
corresponding incidents are listed as follows.
• In the Northeast blackout of 2003, a line out in one area (Ohio) was not conveyed
for a sufficient period of time to the Midwest Operator, leading to failure of con-
vergence of the state estimator, and thereby, unobservability of the system. It
eventually resulted in a widespread blackout throughout parts of the North-
eastern and Midwestern United States and the Canadian province of Ontario,
causing 4 to 10 billion dollars loss and affecting 55 million people [1]. A similar
event resulting from an attack can have devastating economic consequences.
• In 2007, Idaho National Laboratory ran the Aurora Generator Test and demon-
strated a cyber attack in which a diesel generator’s circuit breaker was rapidly
opened and closed by the attack. Such attacks can lead to the generator getting
out of phase from the rest of the power system and eventually exploding [2].
• In 2009, Stuxnet virus ravaged roughly 20% of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges by
3
causing them to spin out of control [3].
• In 2010, Stuxnet malware attacked SCADA systems that use Siemens WinCC
SCADA software, which in turn infected 14 power plants in Germany [4].
• In 2012, the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team re-
vealed that the number of reported cyber attacks is growing and the companies
with access to the country’s power grid become the cyber attack targets [5].
The U.S. Department of Energy reported that from 2011 to 2014, 362 reports
were received from electric utilities of physical or cyber attacks that interrupted
power services [6]. In 2013, CNN reported that hacker hits on US power and
nuclear targets spiked in 2012 [5]. A Department of Homeland Security branch
recorded 161 cyber attacks on the energy sector in 2013, compared to just 31 in
2011 [6], which comprises 60% of all cyber attacks on cyber-physical systems.
From the list above, it is clear that the cyber layer and communication network of
power system are vulnerable to both cyber attacks and communication delays and
errors. Thus, secure and trustworthy cyber systems are crucial for the security and
reliability of power system operation.
Among all the monitoring and sharing data, topology information plays an es-
sential role in power system operation. In transmission level EMSs, various data
processing modules including SE, contingency analysis (CA), and optimal power flow
(OPF) are highly dependent on topology information. Cyber attacks that alter the
system topology information can result in wrong solutions within these modules with
potential consequences including systematic problems and failures. Furthermore, as
the physical components of the electric power system become vulnerable to attacks,
an intelligent attacker can simultaneously attack cyber data with the goal of mask-
ing the physical attack, and hence, worsen the consequences resulting from physical
4
attacks. Therefore, it is crucial to fully understand the consequences of realistic and
credible topology-based cyber-attacks as a first step to thwart such attacks.
1.3 Literature Review
There has been much recent interest in understanding the cyber-security chal-
lenges facing the electric power system. Since it is not possible to review all these
challenges, we will focus on the class of unobservable attacks. The unobservable at-
tacks are a class of cyber attacks in which the attacker focuses on a particular module
and within the module, the data change made by attacker appears like normal states
instead of random noise that can be detected by existing mechanism such as bad
data detection. Although such attacks have been studied, the attack consequences
are still not clear. Our work focus on not only developing unobservable attacks, but
also studying the attack consequences. We briefly review the existing literatures on
unobservable attacks.
In [7], the authors are the first to introduce a class of false data injection (FDI)
attacks on DC SE. The authors show that an attacker with sufficient system knowl-
edge can inject malicious measurements without being detected by existing bad data
detection techniques that are subsequent to SE. In [8], Sandberg et al. introduce two
security indices which quantify the least efforts to launch unobservable FDI attacks
on DC SE. In [9], Teixeira et al. analyze how to completely protect SE by placing
encrypted devices on a set of measurements in power system. In [10], the authors
further propose the minimum cost protection scheme to thwart unobservable FDI at-
tacks. In [11], Kosut et al. discuss the trade-off between attacker’s efforts to maximize
the attack strength and minimize the detection rate.
In contrast to the above mentioned references, in [12], Hug and Giampapa focus on
FDI attacks on AC SE and introduce a class of unobservable attacks that are limited
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to a sub-graph of the networks. They demonstrate that though AC SE is vulnerable
to unobservable FDI attacks, it requires the knowledge of both system topology and
states to launch such attacks. In [13], Liang et al. introduce unobservable FDI attacks
for a nonlinear measurement model of AC SE and demonstrate that such FDI attacks
can lead to a physical generation re-dispatch when none was actually needed which
in turn can cause a line to overload in the physical system.
The impact of FDI attacks on electric power markets is studied in [14]. The
authors demonstrate that the FDI attacks can be utilized to manipulate the locational
marginal prices (LMPs) of ex-post real-time market, and thus, allow the attacker
to profit. In general, attacking the electric power system to create profit in the
market seems complicated since making a profit on market can be done in many
other ways. That is why we need to focus on whether the cyber attacks can have
physical consequences on the power system.
Yet another class of FDI attacks is one that alters topology data in an unobservable
manner. As stated in Section 1.2, topology model is crucial for power system since
incorrect topology data in SE, OPF, and CA can lead to systematic problems and
failures. In [15], Kim and Tong formally introduce an undetectable topology attack as
a specific class of FDI attacks on power systems and evaluate the attack’s impact on
the electric market. The authors design the attack to alter the system topology esti-
mate by injecting malicious measurements and false line status data while remaining
undetected. In [16], Rahman et al. study the impact of the undetectable topology
attack introduced in [15] on DC OPF when DC SE is used; the attack is optimized to
increase total operation cost of the system. In [17], Ashok and Govindarasu analyze
a different class of topology attacks. In these attacks, the attacker compromises the
critical measurements of the system. This leads to incorrect contingency analysis
results, as a result of which, some subsets of the contingencies can be potentially
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neglected by the control center.
In addition of snap-shot attacks, there are growing concerns on the optimal attacks
based on system response to the attacks. In [18] and [19], the authors propose a max-
min attacker-defender model to study the most damaging FDI attacks with both
immediate attacking goal and delayed attacking goal. They formulate a class of load
redistribution attacks as a two-stage optimization problem. They model the attack
as well as the system response in the next time interval, which in turn lead to the
optimal attack which can maximize operation costs based on the system response.
More recently, in [20], the authors introduce a two-stage optimization for the worst
unobservable attacks on AC SE. The objective of the attack is to maximize power
flow on a specific line, and hence, lead to violation in physical system. While [20] is
more closely related, our work focuses on joint physical and unobservable topology
attacks, and therefore, the optimization problem introduced here is different from
[20].
1.4 Thesis Objective and Contribution
In this thesis, we focus on cyber attacks that target to change the topology in-
formation of the system. Although references [15] - [17] have already studied several
classes of topology attacks, the analysis of attacks is either limited to market conse-
quences or the attack model is based on DC SE. The actual physical consequences of
topology attacks are still unclear. Therefore, we seek to understand both the physical
consequences and anomalies resulting from various topology attacks, that in turn can
be used to develop attack detection resiliency mechanisms. To this end, three classes
of attacks are studied in this thesis.
The first class of attacks is unobservable state-preserving topology attacks in which
an attacker can change topology data of the system without changing the states. We
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focus on line-maintaining attacks that can maintain a physically outaged line as active
in cyber layer. An algorithm based on breadth-first search (BFS) is proposed to find
the minimum set of topology and measurements required to launch such attacks.
We demonstrate that such algorithm can enable an attacker to obtain the localized
topology and corresponding measurement data to mount an attack that bypasses
bad data detector and successfully changes topology information of the system in the
cyber layer. However, the experimental analyses suggest that such attacks can be
limited or even detected due to few feasible targets and large load shifts.
The second class of unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attacks that
change both states and topology data to enable a coordinated physical and cyber
attack. Our motivation for including both state and topology information is to focus
on worst-case attacks and to limit detectability via load shifts. We propose a two-step
worst attack strategy to optimize the long-term attack consequences. We define an
optimal attack is one which maximizes power flow on a line subsequent to attacks
followed by SE and DC OPF processing by the system. We demonstrate that attacks
designed with the proposed strategy can successfully mask the physical line outage
from AC SE with limited load shifts and lead to severe physical overflow on the
target line. Resilience detection mechanism as valid historical data comparison for
generation dispatch is proposed to protect the power system.
The third class of attacks is topology-targeted man-in-the-middle communication
attacks which changes the topology alteration information sharing between areas.
Our results demonstrate that such an attack in a distributed power network leads to
a range of possibilities including actual physical line overloads that are not observable
from the cyber measurements; false overload alert in cyber layer; and progressively se-
vere lack of convergence of OPF in both areas. Countermeasures including anomalous
tie-line interchange verification, anomalous re-dispatch alarms, and external contin-
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gency lists sharing are provided to thwart such attacks.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The principal content of this report is partitioned into 6 chapters.
Chapter 1 presents an overview of research background, a literature review, study
objective and contribution.
Chapter 2 presents the mathematical formulation for the various computational
units of power system operation, including SCADA, topology processor, state esti-
mation, and optimal power flow.
In chapter 3, the attack model, implementation, and long-term consequences of
the unobservable state-preserving topology attacks are provided.
In chapter 4, unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attacks are studied.
A two-step worst attack strategy based on two-stage optimization problem is proposed
to study the worst-case attacks. The performance of the attack strategy and the long-
term consequences of such attacks are illustrated via simulation.
In chapter 5, a class of topology-targeted man-in-the-middle (MitM) communi-
cation attacks which changes the topology alteration data sharing between areas is
introduced. The long-term consequences and countermeasures of such attacks are
proposed.
In chapter 6, conclusions and future works are provided.
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Chapter 2
SYSTEM MATHEMATIC MODEL
In this section, we introduce the mathematical formulation for the various com-
putational units of power system operation, including topology processor, state esti-
mation, and optimal power flow units. Throughout, we assume there are nb buses,
nbr branches, ng generators, nload load buses, and nz measurements in the system.
The temporal nature processing of real-time power operation is illustrated in Figure
2.1. In this figure, z and s denote the measurement vector and line status vector,
respectively; G represents the system topology, x = [θ, V ]T is the system state vec-
tor where θ and V are voltage angle and voltage magnitude, respectively; PD and
QD represent the active and reactive loads, respectively; PG and QG represent the
active and reactive power generation. We denote each estimated value with the same
alphabet with a hat, and the optimal value with a star.
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Figure 2.1: Temporal Nature of Real-time Power System Operation.
In this operation loop, SCADA collects line status vector and noisy measurements
of the physical system and passes these data to AC state estimator. The AC state
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estimator then uses these data to estimate topology (topology processing module)
and states (state estimation module). In sequel to SE, bad data detector filtered the
bad data from states. After that, the estimated topology and states are then utilized
to estimate loads, which also need sanity check from operator. Once the estimate
loads pass the sanity check, these data as well as the estimated topology are then
used to compute the OPF. Eventually, the optimal generation dispatch that obtained
from OPF are implemented, and the system comes to a new operation loop.
2.1 System Network and Topology Processor
The electric power system can be represented by a graph G = {N , E} whereN and
E are the sets of buses and lines, respectively. For a specific system, we assume the
static topology is G0 = {N0, E0} where N0 and E0 are the sets of all existing buses and
branches, respectively. Then, the connectivity of N0 with E0 can be represented with
nbr×nb “from” and “to” branch-to-bus incidence matrices AKf and AKt, respectively.
If a branch k exists to connect bus i to bus j, the (k, i)th element of AKf and (k, j)
th
element of AKt are 1 and all other entries of AKf and AKt are set to zeros. The
overall nbr×nb branch-to-bus incidence matrix AKN is calculated using AKf and AKt
as follows
AKN = AKf − AKt. (2.1)
At the control center, SCADA collects line status data as a nbr × 1 vector s with
entries sk ∈ {0, 1} for k ∈ {1, ..., nbr} that indicate the on and off status of circuit-
breakers on each line. The data is then passed to a topology processor which maps the
real-time power system topology along with network connectivity data. The complete
topology information is captured by two matrices Ybr, the branch admittance matrix,
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and Ybus, the bus admittance matrix, defined as
Ybr = D[diag(s)AKN ], (2.2)
and Ybus = [diag(s)AKN ]
TD[diag(s)AKN ] (2.3)
where D denotes the nbr × nbr branch admittance matrix for G0, diag (·) denotes an
operator that takes an n × 1 vector and creates the corresponding n × n diagonal
matrix with the vector elements along the diagonal.
The topology data plays a crucial role in power system operation. It determines
the real-time AC power flow model. Assume V denotes the nb × 1 complex voltage
vector, such that V = V ∠θ, where voltage angle and voltage magnitude, θ and V are
both nb × 1 vectors. The AC power flow model for the system can be written as
Sf
St
Sbus
 =

AKfV · Y ∗brV ∗
−AKtV · Y ∗brV ∗
diag (V ) · Y ∗busV ∗
 (2.4)
where Sf and St are nbr×1 “from” and “to” complex power flow vectors, respectively,
Sbus is nb× 1 complex power injection vector, ∗ represents conjugate of vector in this
subsection.
This model is used in the subsequent SE and OPF modules. In AC SE, the
“from” and “to” power flow measurements of all branches and the power injection
measurements of buses with injection (generation and/or loads) are used to estimate
the states. In AC OPF, “from”, “to” power flows and power injection are used to
form constraints of power balance of buses and thermal limit of branches. Therefore,
a correct topology information ensures the validity of SE and OPF results. If the line
status information is altered by attackers, the topology processor will export incorrect
topology information and hence, lead to wrong estimated states and OPF solutions.
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2.2 State Estimation
Consider an nz × 1 vector z of nonlinear measurements given as
z = h(x,G) + e (2.5)
where x = [θ, V ]T is the system state vector, and e is an nz×1 noise vector which is in-
dependent of x and is modeled as Gaussian distributed with 0 mean and σ2i covariance
such that the measurement error covariance matrix is given by R = diag({σ2i }Mi=1).
The function h(x,G) is a vector of nonlinear functions that describes the relationship
between the system states and measurements for a topology G. Both the line status
data s and the measurements z are collected by the SCADA system. The commonly
obtained measurements in the grid are the active and reactive power flows and bus
injections.
We use weighted least-squares (WLS) AC SE to calculate the θ and V [21]. The
objective of the estimation process is to minimize the sum of the squares of the
weighted deviations of the estimated measurements from z. The states are solved as
a least square problem with the following objective function
min J(x) = (h(x)− z)TR−1(h(x)− z), (2.6)
the solution to which satisfies
g(xˆ) =
∂J(xˆ)
∂x
= HT (xˆ) ·R−1 · (h(xˆ)− z) = 0 (2.7)
where the system Jacobian matrix H = ∂h(x)
∂x
|x=xˆ, and xˆ is the 2nb × 1 estimated
state vectors. The WLS solution for this nonlinear optimization problem can be
solved iteratively.
In fact, measurements collected by SCADA may contain errors that can undermine
the accuracy of estimated states. Therefore, bad data detector should be equipped
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with SE to detect faulty measurements, and hence, protect SE from large errors. The
measurement residual vector is used to detect bad data, as
r = z − h(x,G) (2.8)
where r is the nz × 1 residual vector.
In this paper, the χ2−detector is utilized to detect bad data. The threshold is
determined by the χ2−test. To bypass the bad data detection, the residuals should
satisfy the following relationship
rTR−1r 6 χ2(m−n),p (2.9)
where χ2(m−n),p is the value from χ
2 distribution tables corresponding to a detection
confidence with probability p (e.g. 95%) and m− n degrees of freedom.
If the threshold in (2.9) is violated, largest normalized residual method is further
used for bad data identification as in (2.10).
Max
i
|ri|
σri
6 τr (2.10)
where σri is the standard deviation of the ith residual error ri. If the largest norm
residue test is not passed, the measurement with maximum residue is identified as
bad measurement. The bad measurement is then removed from the measurement
vector and SE is repeated until no bad data is detected.
The SE solution that pass the bad data detection is used to compute the power flow
of the system, which hence yields the estimated loads of the system. The estimated
loads then pass to OPF module for optimal power dispatch solution as describe in
the following subsection. If the state vector is maliciously altered by attacker, it
can result in wrong dispatch solution which can lead the system to uneconomic and
insecure operation states.
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2.3 Optimal Power Flow
The optimal power flow (OPF) problem aims to solve for the optimal power dis-
patch solution. The AC OPF problem can be written as
min
∑
g∈G
Cg(Pg) (2.11)
s.t.
∑
gGn
Pg +
∑
Pk−
∀k(n,;)
∑
Pk
∀k(;,n)
= Pdn, ∀n ∈ B, (2.12)
∑
gGn
Qg +
∑
Qk−
∀k(n,;)
∑
Qk
∀k(;,n)
= Qdn, ∀n ∈ B, (2.13)
Pk = V
2
n (gsn + gnm)− VnVm(gnmcos(θn − θm) (2.14)
+bnmsin(θn − θm)), k ∈ Br
Qk = −V 2n (bsn + bnm)− VnVm(gnmsin(θn − θm) (2.15)
−bnmcos(θn − θm)), k ∈ Br
P 2k +Q
2
k ≤ (Smaxk )2 ∀k ∈ Br (2.16)
Pming ≤ Pg ≤ Pmaxg ∀g ∈ Gi (2.17)
Qming ≤ Qg ≤ Qmaxg ∀g ∈ Gi (2.18)
V minn ≤ Vn ≤ V maxn ∀n ∈ B (2.19)
where Cg(·) is the cost function for generator g; bnm and gnm are the susceptance and
conductance, respectively, of line k from bus n to bus m, bsn and gsn are the shunt
branch susceptance and conductance, respectively, of bus n; k(n, ; ) is one of a set of
lines with bus n as its receiving bus and k(; , n) is one of a set lines with bus n as its
sending bus; Gn is the set of generators at bus n; Pg is the active power output of
generator g with maximum and minimum limit Pmaxg and P
min
g , respectively; Qg is the
reactive power output of generator g with maximum and minimum limit Qmaxg and
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Qming , respectively; Pk and Qk are the active and reactive power flows, respectively,
on line k with line capacity limit Smaxk ; Pdn and Qdn are the active and reactive power
demands, respectively, at bus n; and Vn is the voltage magnitude for bus n with
maximum and minimum limits V maxn and V
min
n , respectively.
The objective in (5.1) is to minimize the total active power generation cost of the
whole power system. Constraints (5.2) and (5.3) represents the active and reactive
power balance constraints for each bus in the system. The constraints in (5.4) and
(5.5) are the active and reactive transmission line power flow constraints for the whole
system while (5.6) is the thermal limit for each transmission line. Constraints (5.7)
and (5.8) are the active and reactive power output limits for each generator while
(5.9) defines the voltage magnitude limits for each bus in the whole system.
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Chapter 3
UNOBSERVABLE STATE-PRESERVING TOPOLOGY ATTACKS
In this chapter, we focus on a non-linear system model (i.e., AC SE) and on
a class of unobservable topology attacks in which an attacker can change topology
information of the system without changing the states. We henceforth refer to such
attacks as unobservable state-preserving topology attacks. These attacks can be of
two types: line-maintaining and line-removing. In a line-maintaining attack, the
attacker changes measurements and line status information to make it appear that
line which is not in the system is now shown as active at the control center via
changes to SCADA data; the opposite is achieved by a line-removing attack. Kim
and Tong in [15] introduce unobservable state-preserving topology attacks; however
the analysis in [15] is restricted to line-removing attacks. To launch such attacks,
the authors propose an attack heuristic in which the attacker can set the power flow
measurements for a specific line to zero and change the power injection measurements
at the end buses of that line.
In this chapter, we focus on a class of unobservable state-preserving line-maintaining
attacks. We seek to understand the minimum amount of information an attacker
needs to launch such attacks. We assume the attacker is aware of a physical outage
in the system and changes the resulting SCADA data (prior to SE) to make it appear
that the line is in service. We denote such a line as the switching attack line here-
inafter. Specifically, false line flow measurements need to be created for the switching
attack line; however, this cannot be achieved by just adjusting the measurements at
the end buses and requires estimating states at those buses as well, since the flow
on the outage line has to be computed. For a reliable state estimate, the attacker
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needs to identify a physical connection (we denote as path hereinafter) between the
end buses of the switching attack line, over which it can estimate states with lo-
cal measurements, and thereby, create an unobservable attack. However, there are
multiple such paths in the system. To create an attack with the smallest set of in-
formation, the attacker needs to find the shortest path. Since the power system can
be represented as an undirected and unweighted graph, algorithms such as Dijkstra’s
and Bellman-Ford, which are used to find the shortest path in directed and weighted
graph, are not suitable in this problem. Therefore, we propose an algorithm based on
breadth-first search (BFS), which is generally used for traversing or searching graph
data structures [22]. We need such an algorithm to search for the shortest path that
connected the end buses of the switching attack line in power system.
3.1 Attack Model
In an unobservable state-preserving topology attack, the attacker aims to ma-
liciously change the system topology from G to a different “target” topology G¯ =
{N , E¯} without changing the states. In this paper, we only consider topology attacks
that perturb line connection E to E¯ ; the attacks aiming to split or merge buses are
out of scope, i.e., N remains unchanged. We define the line with status data changed
by attacker as switching attack line and the end buses of the switching attack line as
switching attack buses.
Topology attacks can be of two types: line-maintaining and line-removing. For
a line-maintaining attack, the attacker maliciously alters the line status data of the
switching attack line and injects false data to make it appear that line which is not
in the original graph E is now shown as active in E¯ ; the opposite is achieved by
a line-removing attack. To launch a state-preserving topology attack, the attacker
injects nbr × 1 line status attack vector b and nz × 1 measurement attack vector a.
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The line status attack vector b has entries bk ∈ {−1, 0, 1} for k ∈ {1, ..., nbr} such
that bk = 1,−1, and 0, correspond to line-maintaining, line-removing and no attack
cases, respectively. This attack modifies (s, z) for topology G to (s¯, z¯) for topology G¯
such that
s¯ = s+ b, and z¯ = z + a. (3.1)
In the absence of noise, the attack vector satisfies
a = h(x, G¯)− h (x,G) . (3.2)
For a cyber-based topology attack considered here, when the states are preserved,
i.e., unchanged, and the system topology except for the switching attack line remains
the same, the attacker needs to change the power flow of the switching attack line.
To achieve this, the attacker only needs to change the power flow measurements on
the switching attack line and power injection measurements on the switching attack
buses to make such attack unobservable.
3.1.1 Line-removing vs. Line-maintaining Attacks
For line-removing attack, as stated in [15], when the attacker sets the switching
attack line status to zero, the “from” and “to” power flow measurements should also
be changed to zero. The modified power injection measurements for bus i are
P ai = Pi − Pij
Qai = Qi −Qij
(3.3)
where Pij and Qij are the physical active and reactive “from” power flows of line ij,
respectively. The modified power injection measurements on bus j obey (3.3), as well.
An example of such attack is shown in Figure 4.1(a). In this case, to create a precise
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attack, the line flow Pij and Qij have to be estimated using all the relevant SCADA
measurements. A heuristic way to creating such attacks is to use just the local power
flow measurements at both ends of the switching attack line. This is proposed in [15]
and the authors have demonstrated its performance via simulation.
In contrast, we argue that for a line-maintaining attack, such a heuristic will not
work. This is because for a line-maintaining attack, the actual “from” and “to” power
flows on the switching attack line are already zero since the switching attack line is
out. When the attacker sets the switching attack line status to 1, the “from” and “to”
power flow measurements should be non-zero since the line appears active at control
center. The modified “from” power flow measurements P aij and Q
a
ij should satisfy
P aij = V
2
i (gsi + gij)− ViVj(gijcos(θi − θj) + bijsin(θi − θj))
Qaij = −V 2i (bsi + bij)− ViVj(gijsin(θi − θj)− bijcos(θi − θj))
(3.4)
where bij and gij are the susceptance and conductance of the switching attack line,
respectively, bsi and gsi are the shunt branch susceptance and conductance of bus
i, respectively. The modified “to” power flow measurements P aji and Q
a
ji also obey
(3.4). From (3.4), we can see that to calculate the false power flow measurements
on the target line, the attacker needs to estimate the states. For the power injection
measurements for bus i, since the power injection for bus i should equal to the sum
of all line power flows from bus i, the measurements should be modified as
P ai = Pi + P
a
ij
Qai = Qi +Q
a
ij
(3.5)
where Pi and Qi are the physical active and reactive power injection measurements,
respectively; P ai and Q
a
i are the injection measurements modified by attacker. The
power injection measurements on bus j also satisfy the relationship in (3.5). An
example of such an attack is shown in Figure 4.1(b).
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Figure 3.1: Examples of Unobservable State-preserving Topology Attacks.
3.2 Unobservable State-preserving Line-maintaining Attacks with Local
Information
We assume the attacker has the following capabilities:
1. Attacker has knowledge of the topology G of the entire network.
2. Attacker has the capability to observe measurements only for a sub-network S
of G and perform SE for S. The choice of S is described in detail in the sequel.
3. Attacker has the capability to change both the line status data of the switching
attack line and the measurements on both switching attack line and target
buses.
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For the system, we assume that the power system is observable prior to the attack.
For nonlinear measurement model and AC SE, the attacker cannot construct a
only with the knowledge of system configuration. In fact, recent work in [12, 13]
show that attack vector constructed with DC measurement model can be detected
when the system uses AC SE. To this end, we model a sophisticated attacker who
attacks the line status data and measurements of the switching attack line and the
power injection measurements on the end buses of switching attack line (switching
attack buses) by first estimating the system states xˆS for S using AC SE. Let IT
represent the set of measurements the attacker needs to modify to launch an attack.
The resulting modified measurement vector z¯ input to SE has entries
z¯i =

zi ,
hi(xˆS , G¯) ,
i /∈ IT
i ∈ IT
(3.6)
For line-maintaining attacks, equations (3.4)−(3.5) imply that the voltage mag-
nitudes and voltage angle difference of the switching attack buses are required to
form the unobservable attack vector. Thus, the attacker has to obtain a good esti-
mate of the voltage magnitudes and voltage angle difference of the switching attack
buses. Since the target line is physically disconnected, the attacker needs to find a
sub-network of the physical system to estimate states on the switching attack buses.
Such a sub-network should contain at least one physical path that connects the two
switching attack buses. By using power flow measurements on the lines of the path,
attacker can estimate the voltage magnitudes and voltage angle differences of the
buses on the path, and thus, obtain a good estimate of the states of the switching
attack buses. For clarification, consider the example shown in Figure 3.2. In this case,
the switching attack line is the line connecting bus 1 and 2. The goal of attacker is to
obtain a good estimate of states on switching attack buses 1 and 2. Assume bus 1 is
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the reference bus. Attacker can use power flow measurements on the line connecting
bus 1 and 4 to calculate V4 and M θ14 = θ1− θ4. Then, the V3 and M θ43 = θ4− θ3 can
be estimated with power flow measurements on the line connecting bus 4 and 3 and
the estimated V4∠θ4. It is the same for estimation of V2 and M θ32 = θ3 − θ2. Then,
attacker can obtain a good estimation of voltage magnitudes V1 and V2, and volt-
age angle differenceM θ12 =M θ14+ M θ43+ M θ32, and hence, calculate the modified
measurements.
Figure 3.2: Illustration of A Shortest Path for Unobservable State-preserving Attack
For a specific switching attack line, there are multiple paths between the two
switching attack buses in the system. To reduce the cost of attacks, attacker needs to
analyze the system topology G and find the shortest path between the two switching
attack buses. Thus, the attack can be launched by estimating a minimal set of
measurements.
We use a BFS algorithm to identify the shortest path that connects the switching
attack buses. The minimal observation sub-network S denotes the connectivity of
the buses and lines on the shortest path. The physical power grid G is represented as
an unweighted and undirected graph in which an edge is a line and a node is a bus.
We assign one of the switching attack buses as the starting bus and the remaining
switching attack bus is the destination bus. The procedure to determine S is as
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follows:
Algorithm 1 BFS for Shortest Path Connecting Switching Attack Buses
Input: G, starting bus, destination bus
Output: shortest path connecting the starting bus and the destination
1. Set the starting bus as the in progress bus and the rest buses as unvisited buses.
Set the level of the current set of in progress buses as k = 0.
2. Search all unvisited buses that are connected (by a branch) to the set of in
progress buses. Mark such unvisited buses as the in progress buses and the
previous set of in progress buses as visited buses. Set the level of the current
set of in progress buses as k = k + 1. If the destination bus is in the set of in
progress buses, that means the shortest path tree has been identified, go to step
3. Otherwise, repeat step 2.
3. Backtrack from the desination bus to the starting bus level-by-level, and identify
the shortest path. If there is more than one shortest path, repeat step 3 until
all shortest paths are identified.
Once S is found, attacker can assign one of the switching attack buses as a slack
bus, collect and use the power flow measurements zS inside S to perform local SE as
follows
min JS(xS) = (h(xS ,S)− zS)TR−1S (h(xS ,S)− zS), (3.7)
the solution to which satisfies
g(xˆS) =
∂J(xˆS)
∂xS
= HT (xˆS) ·R−1S · (h(xS ,S)− zS) = 0 (3.8)
where the system Jacobian matrix H = ∂h(xS ,S)
∂xS
|xS=xˆS . The WLS solution for this
nonlinear optimization problem can be solved iteratively. Then attacker can calculate
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the modified measurements with (4.3).
Since the power system is a complex geographically distributed network, attacker
may be limited to a subset of the network static topology. Under such conditions,
this method can also be applied to find the minimal observation sub-network.
3.3 Switching Attack Line Selection
In practice, to launch an unobservable state-preserving line-maintaining attack,
attackers are limited to finite sets of switching attack lines due to the following reasons:
1. The power injection measurements can only be altered by redistributing loads
in cyber layer. Attacker cannot change generator output data due to direct
communication between control center and power plant.
2. The power injection for no load buses cannot be altered, since load occurring
in no load buses can be immediately detected by operator.
3. Any attacks that can lead to negative loads in cyber layer can be detected.
4. The significant alteration of the system such as system dividing to several islands
(line-removing attack) or islands combining to a whole system (line-maintaining
attack) can lead to operator’s intervention.
Therefore, to launch a successful line-maintaining attack, attacker should analyze the
system topology and operation states prudently to choose a switching attack line.
The following three classes of lines should be avoided as switching attack lines:
1. Single critical line or critical pairs of lines.
2. Lines that once being attacked can lead to negative loads in cyber layer.
3. Lines that connected to no load buses.
25
When eliminates the three classes of lines listed above, the choice of feasible switch-
ing attack lines for attacker can be significantly reduced. Another limitation of these
attacks is that to cause a physical line overload in the system, the load shifts required
at the switching attack buses have to be greater than 10%. Such a change can lead
detection of anomaly. Considering the two defects, we can conclude that vulnerability
of the system to unobservable state-preserving topology attacks is limited.
3.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we use the IEEE 24-bus RTS shown in Figure 3.3 as the test
system. We assume that the measurements in the test system are: (a) active and
reactive power flows on both ends of all lines; and (b) active and reactive power
injection on buses with loads and/or generation; i.e., overall, the number of total
measurements in the test system is 192. We run our simulations with MATLAB
R2014a and MATPOWER 4.1.
3.4.1 Feasible Switching Attack Line Selection
In this subsection, we analyze the test system to identify all feasible switching
attack lines for unobservable state-preserving line-maintaining attacks. We first ex-
clude critical lines and the lines that connected to a no load buses in the system.
For the rest lines, we perform a whole network SE and use the estimated states to
calculate the attack vector. We check the modified loads in cyber layer for each line
and exclude the lines that can lead to negative loads. Table 3.1 demonstrates all the
lines we exclude from the set of feasible target lines and the reason for exclusion.
Overall, for line-maintaining attacks, there are 8 feasible switching attack lines in the
test system, for which the line indices are #2, #5, #8, #9, #12, #13, #34, #35.
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Figure 3.3: IEEE 24-bus Reliable Test System
3.4.2 Minimal Observation Sub-network
In this subsection, we exhaustively illustrate the minimal observation sub-network
of each feasible switching attack line according to the algorithm introduced in Section
??. The details of each minimal observation sub-network for each switching attack line
are demonstrated in Table 3.2. The minimal number of lines and buses (denote as nSl
and nSb, respectively) inside the minimal observation sub-network for each switching
attack line is illustrated in Figure 3.4. That is the minimal information the attacker
needs to observe before launching a successful attack. Since the system is under full
monitoring redundancy, there are 4 measurements which are active and reactive power
flow measurements on both “from” and “to” ends placing on a line. Therefore, the
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Table 3.1: Classification of Infeasible Switching Attack Lines for Undetectable State-
preserving Line-maintaining Attack
Infeasible Reason Infeasible Switching Attack Line
Critical Line #11
Connect to No Load Bus #7, #14−#22, #25−#28, #30−#33, #36−#38
Lead to Negative Load #1, #3, #4, #6, #10, #23, #24
minimum number measurements the attacker needs to access is the minimum number
of observation measurements along the path, as well as the measurements placed on
the switching attack line and the switching attack buses, i.e., 4nSl + 8.
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Figure 3.4: Number of Branches and Buses of the Minimal Observation Sub-network
of Each Switching Attack Line
From these results, we can see that the minimal observation sub-network for each
switching attack line is relatively small compared with the whole network topology
even for a small system such as IEEE 24-bus RTS. The largest minimal observation
sub-network in the test system consists of 4 branches and 5 buses, in which the total
observation measurements number is 16. The number of measurements of this sub-
network that attacker need to access inside is 24, which is 12.5% of the test system.
Therefore, it is possible for attacker to launch such attacks with only a small subset
of information of the system.
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Table 3.2: Minimal Observation Sub-network for All Feasible Switching Attack Lines
Target Branches of Minimal Connectivity
Line # Observation Sub-network of Buses
2 #1, #4, #8, #6 1⇒2⇒4⇒9⇒3
5 #1, #3, #9, #10 2⇒1⇒5⇒10⇒6
8 #4, #1, #5, #6 4⇒2⇒1⇒3⇒9
9 #3, #1, #5, #10 5⇒1⇒2⇒6⇒10
12 #13, #16, #14 8⇒10⇒11⇒9
13 #12, #14, #16 8⇒9⇒11⇒10
34 #35 19⇒20
35 #34 19⇒20
3.4.3 Undetectability of Attacks
In this subsection, we test the unobservable state-preserving line-maintaining at-
tacks with both global information and local information on the test system. In our
simulation, we use MATPOWER to generate measurements and perform state esti-
mation. The default setting of the IEEE 24-bus system in MATPOWER is utilized
for simulation. We assume the system is operating under optimal power flow and the
loads of the system are constant. The errors for all measurements are assumed to
be ei ∼ N (0, 0.01) and the χ2 detector threshold is chosen for a 95% confidence in
detection.
We test 1000 trials for each switching attack line with two attack regimes, global
information regime and local information regime. The global information regime is
that attacker can observe all measurements in the system and perform AC SE with
whole network topology and measurements. While the local information regime is
that attacker can only observe the measurements inside the minimal sub-network
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S and perform AC SE with topology and measurements of S. In each trial, the
measurements are generated by adding random Gaussian noise to the actual power
flows and injections of the test system. The attacker first uses both global and
local information regime to obtain the estimated states. Then the attack vectors
are calculated with both regimes, and added to the corresponding measurements
to get two sets of corrupted measurements. We use these corrupted measurements
to perform AC SE of the whole network to obtain residuals and use χ2−test with
the residuals. If the residual is greater than the threshold, we assume this trial as
detected trial. We calculate the detection probability as pdetection =
#detection trials
#trials
. The
detection probabilities of attacks with both global information and local information
for each switching attack line are demonstrated in Figure 3.5. The blue dash and dot
line represents the 5% false alarm constraint of the χ2 detector.
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Figure 3.5: Detection Probability (1000 Trials) of Unobservable State-preserving
Line-maintaining Attacks on Both Global Information and Local Information (False
Alarm Const. = 5%).
From Figure 3.5, we can see that for most switching attack lines, the detection
probabilities of attacks generated with global information are lower than those with
local information. However, both of them are lower than the false alarm constraint,
which means the proposed attacks will not be detected.
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3.4.4 Load Shifts and Long-term Consequences
In this subsection, we illustrate the physical consequences of unobservable state-
preserving line-maintaining attacks. The number of switching attack lines is limited
to 1. We assume the system is operating under optimal power flow and the loads of
the system are constant during the simulation time period. To model realistic power
systems, we assume that there are a few lines congested prior to the attack and the
attacker chooses one such line as target to maximize power flow.
For each switching attack line, we exhaustively test the long-term consequences
under all feasible 1 congested line pattern. This is achieved in simulation by reducing
the line rating to 90% of the base case power flow to create congestion. These attack
consequences are quantified by comparing the cyber power flow and physical power
flow over the entire attack time duration. The cyber power flow is the power flow
obtained from the OPF result in the control center. The physical power flow, on
the other hand, is the real power flow values of the system after dispatching with
the most recent OPF dispatch solution with the correct topology information. The
overall statistics results are demonstrated in Table 3.3. It should be noticed that,
even for the potential feasible switching attack lines, under some specific congestion
pattern, the unobservable state-preserving topology attack can be generated at the
first few events. Then after several re-dispatching processes, the updated attack
vector under current operation state can lead to negative loads in cyber layer, which
will be detected by the operator. Thus, such cases can not be assumed as feasible
attack cases.
Table 3.3: Post E0 System Behavior with Sustained Unobservable State-preserving
Line-maintaining Attack.
Total Feasible Case Power Flow Overload No Violation
255 3.92% 96.08%
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In Table 3.3, 3 disparities have been observed between the cyber and physical
power flow, which we classified as Power Flow Overload cases and No Violation
cases. In Power Flow Overload cases, the overload problems keep occurring due to
re-dispatching with incorrect topology information. In No Violation cases, there’s no
overload or a line overloaded in Event 0 but the power flow can finally reduce below
100% of the rating in the simulation time period. In Not Converge cases, AC OPF
module with false topology information in the cyber layer finally fails to converge
after several events. We assume cases with overload as successful attacks and cases
with no violation as unsuccessful attacks. Then from Table 3.3, we can see that
the percentage of total successful unobservable state-preserving attacks is 3.92%. It
shows the vulnerability of the test system to such attacks. Since successful attack
cases are in low proportion, the long term negative implication for the undetected
state-preserving topology attack is limited.
The active load shift percentage for all feasible state-preserving line-maintaining
attacks in IEEE 24-bus reliable test system is shown in Figure 3.6. We can observe
that only 10.98% of the total feasible cases with the active power load shift within 4%
for line-maintaining attacks. Cases with active power load shift greater than 50% are
60% of the total feasible cases. In practice, a large active power load shift will lead to
operator intervention. Thus, for the test system, most of the feasible attack cases can
lead to large load shifts, and hence, being detected. Furthermore, by observing the
cases that cause less than 10% load shift, we find that none of these cases can lead to
successful attack results. Thus, we can conclude that it is difficult for unobservable
state-preserving topology attacks to pass the sanity check in the system while causing
severe consequences.
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Figure 3.6: Overall Statistics Results of Active Power Load Shift Percentage for All
Feasible Attack Cases within Unobservable State-preserving Topology Attack.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we focus on unobservable state-preserving topology attacks, espe-
cially the line-maintaining attacks. We propose an algorithm based on BFS to find
the minimum local information required to perform such attacks. We have shown
that our proposed algorithm can enable an attacker to obtain the localized topology
and corresponding measurement data to mount an attack that bypasses bad data
detector and successfully changes topology information of the system in the cyber
layer. Moreover, we identify that such attacks have three categories of limitations
for (a) limit set of switching attack lines due to system characteristics; (b) large load
shifts resulting from attacks; and (c) less severe long-term consequences caused by
attacks. Therefore, such attacks can be detected with a valid load shifts monitoring
mechanism.
To overcome such limitations, a class of more sophisticated attacks in which both
topology information and system states are changed by attacker in an unobservable
manner are introduced in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
UNOBSERVABLE STATE-AND-TOPOLOGY CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS
In this chapter, we study a class of more powerful attacks in which an attacker
can change both states and topology data to enable a coordinated physical and cy-
ber attack and intensify its damage. While changes in LMP and operation costs
demonstrate the economic effect of unobservable attacks, an important question that
remains to be addressed is whether serious damage such as instability, cascading
failures, and blackouts that can potentially cripple society and the economy can be
caused by cyber-physical attacks on the grid. In this chapter, we introduce a long-
term attack model that focus on masking physical attack, creating overloading on a
line while avoiding being detected in both SE and the subsequent modules.
The attacks studied in this chapter consist of physical attacks that cause trans-
mission line outage in physical layer and cyber attacks that change both states and
topology data in cyber layer. These attacks in cyber layer are formally introduced in
[15]; however the analysis in [15] is restricted to unobservable state-preserving topol-
ogy attacks. As stated in Chapter 3, the state-preserving attacks are limited due
to few feasible switching attack lines, large load shifts, and such attacks can hardly
lead to long-term severe consequences. Therefore, our motivation for including both
state and topology information in this chapter is to focus on worst-case attacks and
to limit detectability via the data processing modules subsequent to SE (e.g., load
monitoring). Furthermore, an attack by itself is meaningless unless its consequences
on the physical grid can be quantified. To this end, we seek to understand whether an
unobservable topology attack coordinating with a physical attack can lead to another
physical line overloading. We propose a two-step strategy to determine the worst
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attack. The first step determines the physical attack target and the worst operation
states resulting from cyber attack, while the second step determines the cyber attack
vector that can move the system from any operation states to the worst operation
states. Each step is a two-stage optimization problem in which the first stage mod-
els the attack and the second stage models the system response via re-dispatch to
the attack. Thus, an optimal attack is one which maximizes power flow on a line
subsequent to FDI changes by attacker followed by SE and DC OPF processing by
the system. It is this temporal and modular processing aspect of the cyber layer of
the electric grid that our two-step attack strategy captures. Such a two-stage opti-
mization is studied in [18] from the viewpoint of the attacker maximizing the system
dispatch operating costs. More recently, in [20], the authors introduce a two-stage
optimization for unobservable attacks on AC SE. While [20] is more closely related,
our work focuses on joint physical and unobservable topology attacks, and therefore,
the optimization problem introduced here is different from [20].
An important contribution of our work is the observation that FDI attacks de-
signed to be unobservable within a specific computing module (e.g., SE) can be
detected when the end-to-end processing units of the system are jointly modeled. For
a state-preserving attack introduced in Chapter 3, to cause a physical line overload
of an adjacent line, our experiments have shown that the load shift required at the
attack buses have to be larger than 10%; such a change leads to operator interven-
tion, and detection of anomaly. Therefore, for detectability reasons, the attacker
changes both states and topology information in order to distribute the load shift
over a sub-graph of the network. However resources constraints limit the attacker’s
network size. Thus, in our formulation, the goal is to maximize the power flow on
a particular line subject to constraints on (a) attacker resources (number of bus and
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line measurements to change); and (b) detection via bounds on load shift.
4.1 Attack Model
The unobservable state-and-topology attack modeling both a physical attack and
a coordinated cyber attack. We will first discuss the physical attack and then the
coordinated cyber attack that mask the physical attack.
4.1.1 Physical Attack
In power system, components such as generators, substations, buses, lines and
transformers are all vulnerable to physical attacks. Among these components, at-
tackers prefer to selecting transmission lines as targets since they are the most un-
protected [23]. Attacking transmission line can reduce the reliability of power system
and under some conditions, lead to violations such as overloading on other lines or
load shedding. Furthermore, physical attacks that target at transmission lines are
easier to become unobservable when coordinating with cyber attacks. Thus, we only
consider the physical attack aims to cause transmission line outage in this chapter.
When a transmission line is taking down by physical attack, the topology of the
system are altered. To hide such topology change, attacker must launch unobservable
cyber topology attacks which modify the line status data and corresponding measure-
ments. Therefore, it is important to understand the attack model and characteristics
of unobservable topology attacks in cyber layer.
4.1.2 Cyber Attack: Masking Physical Attack via an Unobservable Topology
Attack
In a general topology attack, the attacker modifies line status as well as related
bus measurements to alter the system topology G to a different “target” topology
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G¯ = {N , E¯}. As stated in Chapter 3, we only consider topology attacks that perturb
branch connection E to E¯ ; the attacks aiming to split or merge buses are out of scope,
i.e., N remains unchanged. We define lines with line status data changed by attacker
as switching attack line.
Topology attacks can be of two types: line-maintaining and line-removing. For a
line-maintaining attack, the attacker changes measurements and line status data to
make it appear that line which is not in the original graph E is now shown as active in
E¯ ; the opposite is achieved by a line-removing attack. To launch a general topology
attack, the attacker injects nbr×1 line status attack vector b and nz×1 measurement
attack vector a. The line status attack vector b has entries bk ∈ {−1, 0, 1} for k ∈
{1, ..., nbr} such that bk = 1,−1, and 0, correspond to line-maintaining, line-removing
and no attack cases, respectively. These changes lead to a new system state x¯ for the
system under attack. This attack modifies (s, z) for topology G to (s¯, z¯) for topology
G¯ such that
s¯ = s+ b, and z¯ = z + a. (4.1)
In the absence of noise, the attack vector satisfies
a = h(x¯, G¯)− h (x,G) . (4.2)
Since the physical attack we focus on is to trip lines, to hide such attacks, the
unobservable topology attacks studied hereinafter are the line-maintaining attacks.
The simplest subclass of unobservable topology attacks that can hide the physical
attacks are state-preserving attacks introduced in Chapter 3. These attacks aim
to change the system topology information while preserving the states. Attacker
only need to modify (a) the line status data of switching attack line, (b) power
flow measurements on the line, and (c) the power injection measurements on buses
connecting to the switching attack line to accomplish such attacks. Therefore, the
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resources required by state-preserving topology attacks are relatively less. However,
since the power injection measurements can only be altered by shifting loads in cyber
layer, attackers are limited to a small set of switching attack lines which connecting
two load buses as stated in Subsection 3.4.4. Another crucial limitation of these
attacks is that the load shifts caused by such attacks can be greater than 10% on load
buses (see Section 3.4.4). Such a change can lead to detection of anomaly.
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Figure 4.1: Example of Modified Meters and Line Status Data for (a) Unobservable
State-preserving Topology Attack; and (b) Unobservable Joint Topology and State
Attack.
To avoid these defects, we focus on general topology attacks, in which attacker
change both states and topology information, hereinbelow.
We assume the attacker has the following capabilities:
1. Attacker has knowledge of the static topology G¯0 of the entire network prior to
physical attacks.
2. Attacker has the capability to launch physical attack, observe and change mea-
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surements only for a sub-graph S of G0. The choice of S is described in detail
in the sequel.
3. Attacker has the capability to perform SE and compute modified measurements
for S.
For the system, we assume that the power system is observable prior and post to the
physical attack.
As stated in Section 3.2, for nonlinear measurement model, we model a sophis-
ticated attacker who attacks measurements and line status data for a sub-graph S
of the network by first estimating the system states xˆS for S using AC SE. The at-
tacker then chooses a small set of buses in S to change states from the estimate xˆS
to x¯S = xˆS + c such that the measurement vector after attack z¯ is
z¯i =

zi ,
hi(xˆS + c, G¯) ,
i /∈ IS
i ∈ IS
. (4.3)
Changing states and topology data both lead to changes in power flow measure-
ments on branches and power injection measurements on load buses in S. For non-load
buses in S, the attacker should ensure that within attacks, the sum of power flow on
the buses and generation (if exists) should be zeros. Thus, the states changing of
non-load buses is dependent on the states changing of the neighboring load buses.
We hence define the load buses with states changing as center buses of S.
Another characteristics of S is that all states inside S are observable to attacker.
For the switching attack line, since they are disconnected in physical system, attacker
should satisfy that there are path inside S to connect the switching attack buses as
introduced in Section 3.2.
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The methods to identify a sub-graph for unobservable FDI attacks that change
states with topology unchanged in non-linear model are introduced in [12, 13] and
method to identify sub-graph for unobservable state-preserving topology attacks are
introduced in Section 3.2. In this chapter, we use a similar method to identify the
sub-graph for a general topology attacks as follows.
1. Determine the center buses, and include all center buses in S.
2. Extend S from center buses by including all buses and branches connected to
center buses.
3. If there are non-load buses on the boundary of S, extend S by including all
adjacent buses of the non-load boundary buses and the corresponding branches.
4. Repeat Step 3 until all boundary buses of S are load buses.
5. Check if there is a path in S that can connect the two end buses of the switching
attack line. If such path exits, then S is the attack sub-graph. If there is no
such path, go to Step 6.
6. Use Algorithm 1 introduced in Section 3.2 to find the shortest path connecting
the two switching attack buses. Include the shortest path (buses and branches)
in S. Then this S is the attack sub-graph.
Sub-graph identified with this method ensures the observability of states inside it
to attacker. It also allows the states of the boundary buses to remain unchanged via
changes to load injections. As stated in Chapter 3, large changes in load estimates
can be detected. Thus, the attacker has to determine the state change vector c such
that the load shifts at all load buses in S are bounded.
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4.2 Worst Attack Strategy
In this section, we develop a worst attack strategy in which attacker determines a
cyber-physical attack to (a) trip a line in physical system and hide the physical attack
in cyber layer; and (b) maximize power flow on a specific line in physical system with
sparsest attack vector. In particularly, we define the line that attacker choose to
maximize power flow on as target line.
The strategy we proposed consists of two steps. In the first step, we determine the
switching attack line that attacker prefer to trip and a cyber attack vector that can
lead to the maximum power flow on the target line within limited number of center
buses and bounds on load shifts. Specifically, the cyber attack vector solved in this
step is corresponding to the optimal states after re-dispatch within OPF instead of
the current operation states. Thus, such attack vector cannot be applied directly to
launch unobservable attacks under current operation states. To solve this problem,
we use the second step to determine the attack vector that can be injected to the
current operation states and lead to the worst operation states solved in Step 1 that
can cause maximum power flow on the target line after re-dispatch. We henceforth
define the attack vector solved in the second step as initial attack vector. The details
of the two steps are introduced in the following subsections.
4.2.1 Step 1: Maximize Power Flow on a Line
In the first step, we propose a two-stage optimization problem. Such a problem
determines the attack vector c and the line status change vector b such that at least
one line in S has maximal power flow subject to bounds on load shift and number of
center buses with states changed. The two-stage optimization is given as
max PKl − ζ ‖cL‖0 (4.4)
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s.t. − τPD 6 H¯1 (θ∗ + c)− AKNP ∗K 6 τPD (4.5)
‖cL‖0 6 N0 (4.6)
nbr∑
k=1
(1− sk) = NT , sk ∈ {0, 1} (4.7)
(AKf + AKt) s > 1 (4.8)
{θ∗, P ∗G, P ∗K} = arg
{
min
θ,PG,PK
ng∑
g=1
Cg (PGg)
}
(4.9)
s.t. AGNPG − AKNPK = PD (λ) (4.10)
−PmaxK 6 H¯2 (θ + c) 6 PmaxK (µ−, µ+) (4.11)
PminG 6 PG 6 PmaxG (α−, α+) (4.12)
PK = diag (s) · H¯2θ∗ (4.13)
where c is nb× 1 attack vector; AGN is nb× ng generator to bus connectivity matrix;
Cg (·) is the cost function for generator g; PG is ng× 1 active power generation vector
with maximum and minimum limit PmaxG and P
min
G , respectively; PK is nbr×1 physical
power flow vector with thermal limit PmaxK ; λ is nb × 1 dual variable vector of power
balance constraints; µ∓ are nbr × 1 dual variable vectors of minimum and maximum
power flow limit constraints, respectively; α∓ are nb × 1 dual variable vectors of
minimum and maximum active power generation output constraints, respectively;
H¯1 is nb × nb dependency matrix between power injection and voltage angle related
to G¯; H¯2 is nbr×nb dependency matrix between power flow and voltage angle related
to G¯; PD is nb × 1 active power load vector in physical system, which has maximum
load shift percentage τ ; ζ is the weight of the norm of attack vector c; N0 is the
maximum number of center buses that can be attacked; NT is the maximum number
of switching attack lines; L is the set of load buses.
The goal of the attack in (4.4) is a multi-objective problem which includes maxi-
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mizing the power flow on a specific line l to create an overload, while minimizing the
l0-norm of the attack vector. The power flow on l is maximized along the direction
of the power flow prior to attack. The first stage optimization is to determine the
cyber attack vector subject to limits on (a) load shift as in (4.4), and (b) an l0-norm
constraint on the cyber attack vector corresponding to load buses as in (4.6); and
physical attack targets subject to a bound on the total number of switching attack
lines as in (4.7). Constraint (4.8) guarantees the observability of the physical power
system post to the selected physical attack. The second stage optimization represents
DCOPF, whose aim is to minimize operation cost in (4.9), subject to power balance,
thermal limit and generation limit constraints in (4.10)−(4.12), respectively, and the
physical power flow on each line is computed in (4.13). Thus, only the voltage angle
states are formulated in this problem, and all voltage magnitudes are set to 1.
This two-stage optimization problem is nonlinear and non-convex. For tractability,
we modify several constraints.
Constraint (4.13) is a nonlinear constraint which includes the product of binary
variable s and continuous variable θ. It can be replaced by a linear form as follows
PK − H¯2θ∗ 6M1 (1− s) (β+)
−PK + H¯2θ∗ 6M1 (1− s) (β−)
PK 6M1 · s (γ+)
−PK 6M1 · s (γ−)
(4.14)
where β± and γ± are nbr × 1 dual variable vectors for the corresponding constraints
and M1 is a large number.
Constraint (4.6) is l0−norm constraint of the attack vector corresponding to load
buses, which is nonlinear and generally non-convex. It can be relaxed to a corre-
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sponding conditional l1−norm constraint as:
‖cL‖1 =
∑
n∈L
|cn| 6 N1 (4.15)
where N1 is the non-negative.
However, constraint (4.15) is still nonlinear. We hence linearize it as follows:
cn 6 un
−cn 6 un∑
n∈L
un 6 N1
(4.16)
where u is nload × 1 non-negative slack variable vector.
Once the attack vector determined by s and c is given in the first stage opti-
mization problem, the second stage DCOPF problem (4.9)−(4.12) and (4.14) is then
convex. The second stage optimization problem can then be replaced by its Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions. The two-stage optimization problem can
hence be converted to a single-stage problem.
The KKT condition of the second stage problem can be written as
∇
(
ng∑
g=1
Cg
(
P ∗Gg
))
+ λT · ∇ (AGNP ∗G − AKNP ∗K − PD)
+
[
µ−;µ+
]T · ∇

 −H¯2 (θ∗ + c)
H¯2 (θ
∗ + c)
−
 PmaxK
PmaxK


+
[
α−;α+
]T · ∇

 −P ∗G
P ∗G
−
 −PminG
PmaxG


+
[
β−; β+
]T · ∇

 −P ∗K
P ∗K
+
 H¯2θ∗
−H¯2θ∗
−M1 ·
 1− s
1− s


+
[
γ−; γ+
]T · ∇

 −P ∗K
P ∗K
−M1 ·
 s
s

 = 0 (4.17)
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diag
([
µ−;µ+
]) ·

 −H¯2 (θ∗ + c)
H¯2 (θ
∗ + c)
−
 PmaxK
PmaxK

 = 0 (4.18)
diag
([
α−;α+
]) ·

 −P ∗G
P ∗G
−
 −PminG
PmaxG

 = 0 (4.19)
diag
([
β−; β+
]) ·

 −P ∗K
P ∗K
+
 H¯2θ∗
−H¯2θ∗
−M1 ·
 1− s
1− s

 = 0 (4.20)
diag
([
γ−; γ+
]) ·

 −P ∗K
P ∗K
−M1 ·
 s
s

 = 0 (4.21)
(4.10)− (4.12), (4.14)[
µ−;µ+;α−;α+; β−; β−; γ−; γ+
]
> 0 (4.22)
where constraint (4.17) is the partial gradient optimal condition, (4.18)−(4.21) are
the complementary slackness constraints, (4.10)−(4.12) and (4.14) are the primal
feasibility constraints, and (4.22) represents the dual feasibility constraints.
Particularly, the complementary slackness constraints (4.18)−(4.21) are nonlin-
ear since they include product of continuous variables. We then linearize them by
introducing new binary variables δµ± , δα± , δβ± , and δγ± which can be written as
(4.23)−(4.27).
The equivalent single-stage mix-integer linearize expression of the original two-
stage problem (4.4)−(4.27) can be modeled as following:
max PKl − ζ
∑
n∈L
un
s.t. (4.4), (4.7)− (4.8), (4.14), (4.16)
(4.10)− (4.12)
(4.17), (4.22)
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
µ− −M · δµ− 6 0
H¯2 (θ
∗ + c) + PmaxK 6M (1− δµ−)
µ+ −M · δµ+ 6 0
−H¯2 (θ∗ + c) + PmaxK 6M (1− δµ+)
(4.23)

α− −M · δα− 6 0
P ∗G − PminG 6M (1− δα−)
α+ −M · δα+ 6 0
−P ∗G + PmaxG 6M (1− δα+)
(4.24)

β− −M · δβ− 6 0
P ∗K − H¯2θ∗ +M1 (1− s) 6M (1− δβ−)
β+ −M · δβ+ 6 0
−P ∗K + H¯2θ∗ +M1 (1− s) 6M (1− δβ+)
(4.25)

γ− −M · δγ− 6 0
P ∗K +M1 · s 6M (1− δγ−)
γ+ −M · δγ+ 6 0
−P ∗K +M1 · s 6M (1− δγ+)
(4.26)
δµ− , δµ+ , δα− , δα+ , δβ− , δβ+ , δγ− , δγ+ ∈ {0, 1} (4.27)
where M is a large positive number. Particularly, M1 and M are different values and
M1 M .
4.2.2 Step 2: Determine Initial Attack Vector
For general topology attacks, the physical loads and cyber loads (denote as P¯D)
satisfy the relationship in (4.28) and (4.29), respectively.
PD = AGNPG −H1θ, (4.28)
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P¯D = AGNPG − H¯1 (θ + c) . (4.29)
Therefore, the load shift caused by general unobservable topology attacks can be
calculated as
4PD = P¯D − PD = H1θ − H¯1 (θ + c) . (4.30)
From equation (4.30), it is obvious that the load shift values are determined by
both cyber attack vector and physical states values. Thus, the attack vector c deter-
mined in Step 1 is only unobservable when system voltage angel is θ∗. For system
under different operation states, such attack vector cannot guarantee the load shifts
resulting from attacks are within the load shift bounds. Therefore, an initial attack
vector which can move the system from the operation states immediately after the
physical attack to the worst states solved in the previous step should be determined.
We use the following two-stage optimization problem to choose an initial attack vector
within the minimum attack subgraph.
min
∑
n∈L
un (4.31)
s.t. − τPD 6 H¯1
(
θ0 + c
0
)−H1θ0 6 τPD (4.32) c
0
n 6 un
−c0n 6 un
(4.33)
{θ∗, P ∗G} = arg
{
min
θ,PG
ng∑
g=1
Cg (PGg)
}
(4.34)
s.t. AGNPG − H¯1θ = PD +H1θ0 − H¯1
(
θ0 + c
0
)
(λ) (4.35)
−PmaxK 6 H¯2θ 6 PmaxK (µ−, µ+) (4.36)
PG = P
∗
G1 (α) (4.37)
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where c0 is nb × 1 initial attack vector; θ0 is nb × 1 voltage angle vector immediately
after physical attack; P ∗G1 is ng × 1 optimal generation vector solved in step 1; α is
ng×1 dual variable vector of constraints (4.37). The objective (4.31) combining with
constraints (4.33) is to minimize the l1−norm of the attack vector. Constraint (4.31)
represents load shift limitation. Constraints (4.34)−(4.37) represent the second stage
DCOPF problem, which guarantee that the attack vector selected in the first stage
can lead to the optimal dispatch P ∗G1. This problem can be converted to a single stage
optimization problem by replacing the second stage problem to its KKT condition
as well. The modification of second stage problem to its KKT condition is similar as
stated in the first step.
4.3 Implementation
The worst attack strategy introduced in Section 4.2 determines the attack vector
under DC measurement model. As stated in 4.1.2, such attack can be detected by
AC SE. Thus, to implement an unobservable joint physical and cyber attack, attacker
should construct an AC attack with the attack vector solved in the worst attack
strategy.
The procedure of attack implementation is as follows:
1. Solve the two-step worst attack strategy problem as introduced in Section 4.2.
2. Determine the attack sub-graph S. As stated in 4.1.2, S is determined by the
switching attack line and center buses. Attackers can identify the center buses
with cyber attack vector c, and then use center buses and the switching attack
line to determine S within the sub-graph searching method stated in Subsection
4.1.2.
3. Observe the measurements inside S.
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Figure 4.2: Temporal Nature of Real-time Power System Operation within Attack.
4. Launch the physical attack on the switching attack line and denote the corre-
sponding operation loop as Event 0.
5. Launch the initial unobservable topology attack immediately after Event 0 as:
1) perform local SE inside S; 2) calculate the modified measurements with the
estimated states inside S and c0 as (4.3); and 3) replace the measurements with
the modified ones. Such an attack can mislead the system operation from the
current states to the worst states.
6. Sustain the attack by injecting modified measurements computed with the esti-
mated states and c in Event t, t = 1...T . T represents the operation loop when
the target line is tripped by protection or the system configuration is changed.
The temporal nature of system operation within attack is shown in Figure 4.2.
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4.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we test the behavior of attacks designed with the two-step worst
attack strategy (in Section 4.2) and long-term consequences of such attacks in non-
linear model. The test system is the IEEE 24-bus reliable test system (RTS). We
assume the system is operating under optimal power flow and the loads of the system
are constant during the simulation time period. To model realistic power systems, we
assume that there are congestions prior to the attack and the attacker chooses one
congested line as target to maximize power flow. We use MATPOWER to run AC
power flow and AC OPF. The optimization problem is solved with CPLEX.
4.4.1 Solution for Worst Unobservable Topology Attack Designed with Two-step
Attack Strategy
The solution of the worst unobservable topology attack determined by the two-
step worst attack strategy is tested in this subsection. In order to understand the
worst-case effect of attacks, we assume there was a line congested prior to the physical
attack. This is achieved in simulation by reducing the line rating to 90% of the original
power to create congestion. The attacker favors on the congested line and aims to
maximize the power flow with limited l1-norm of attack vector. We exhaustively
test the 38 lines as power flow maximization targets in the system. We choose ζ
to be 1% of the original power flow on the target line. Table 4.3 demonstrates the
overall solutions with load shift bounds τ = 10%, NT = 1, and the l1-norm constraint
N1 = 0.06.
Table 4.3: Summary of Attack Cases for 38 Target Lines with τ = 10%, NT = 1,
and N1 = 0.06.
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Congested Outaged l1- norm Center DC PF AC PF
Line # Line # Bus # (%) (%)
1 6 0.0267 2 75.23 99.60
2 6 0.0267 2 94.11 120.78
3 1 0.033 4 127.31 121.41
4 6 0.038 4 118.24 114.81
5 6 0.06 6 118.42 114.00
6 2 0.0093 2 132.52 123.57
7 24 0.0467 5 111.84 114.12
8 1 0.0328 3 129.66 127.88
9 2 0 0 19.71 99.96
10 1 0.0275 4 58.98 100.01
11 2 0 0 57.42 100.00
12 2 0.06 4 133.18 121.19
13 9 0.06 4 143.87 127.31
14 6 0.06 6 119.73 117.06
15 33 0.0573 10 109.00 108.62
16 38 0.0535 8 109.17 109.78
17 12 0.0308 3 101.25 102.06
18 35 0.06 8 114.14 114.33
19 38 0.06 8 114.59 109.50
20 6 0.031 3 107.22 106.28
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Congested Outaged l1- norm Center DC PF AC PF
Line # Line # Bus # (%) (%)
21 37 0.06 9 108.81 108.84
22 36 0.0046 3 109.70 109.92
23 38 0.0063 2 104.88 104.49
24 31 0.0085 2 168.38 166.54
25 26 0.0563 3 164.74 164.21
26 25 0.0563 3 164.74 164.21
27 24 0.0531 6 112.47 114.58
28 26 0.06 3 138.98 138.27
29 37 0.0157 3 130.25 128.06
30 31 0.0221 4 172.20 170.87
31 38 0.0029 2 211.12 213.57
32 31 0.0065 2 204.64 202.47
33 31 0.0065 2 204.64 202.47
34 35 0.0146 2 184.34 182.85
35 34 0.0146 2 184.34 182.85
36 37 0.06 6 197.82 196.61
37 36 0.06 6 197.82 196.61
38 31 0.0025 1 191.31 192.33
*PF: Power flow
From Table4.3 we can observe that the attack vector determined by the two-stage
optimization problem can lead to overflow in 31 target lines in linear model, which are
81.58% successful attacks. For all successful attack cases, when applying the attack
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vector in non-linear model, the physical power flow (we denote it as AC PF in Table
4.3) in each line is comparable to the power flow solved in linear model (we denote
it as DC PF in the table). For the 7 cases without DC overflow, the physical power
flow on each line is larger than the computed DC power flow. This is caused by the
losses and reactive power flow on the non-linear model. In particular, 2 cases with
target lines #9 and #11, respectively, have no center buses, which are equivalent to
the state-preserving attacks introduced in Chapter 3. For these cases, the maximum
power flow on the target lines under the limited bounds for load shifts and l1-norm of
attack vector, the maximum power flows that can be obtained are equivalent to those
resulting from state-preserving attacks. The constraint N1 = 0.06 is a small l1−norm
constraint that corresponds to a sparse attack vector. Therefore, we can conclude
that under limited attack resources, the worst unobservable state-and-topology cyber
physical attacks determined by the proposed attack strategy can lead to overflow in
most target lines. Thus, the test system is vulnerable to such attacks.
In Figures. 4.3 and 4.4, we illustrate the l1-norm constraint on the maximum
power flow, the physical outage line, and the l0-norm and the l1-norm of the attack
vector for target line #12 and #13, respectively. In each sub-figure, we illustrate the
two solutions: one with (red) ζ and one without ζ (black) in the objective function.
In Figure 4.3(b), the switching attack line chosen for the target line #12 overlaps
for cases with or without the objective that minimize l1-norm of the attack vector.
As the l1-norm constraint increase, the switching attack line also change from line
#2 to line #8. This illustrates that as the constraint for the sparse of attack vector
relax, the outage line that can lead to higher overflow can be chosen. The large
load shifts caused by the physical attack can be redistributed to more buses. From
Figures. 4.3(a), (c), and (d), we can see that the two solutions overlap as the l1-norm
constraint increase from 0.06 to 0.135. However, as the l1-norm constraint continues
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to increase, the maximum power flow for solution with ζ stop increasing while that for
solution without ζ keep increasing. The variations for l1-norm and l0-norm of attack
vector are the same, which shown in (c) and (d). This shows the trade-off between
the conflict objective that maximize the target line power flow while minimize the
l1-norm of attack vector. In Figure 4.4, the second term objective also affects the
chosen of switching attack line (see sub-figure (b)). The choices of switching attack
line are different of the two classes of solution as the l1-norm constraint ranges from
0.07 to 0.095. However, the maximum power flow on the target line doesn’t change in
this range. Sub-figure (c) and (d) show that the l1-norm and l0-norm of attack vector
for solutions with ζ are smaller than those without ζ in this range. Such behavior
shows that choice of switching attack line changes to obtain the solution that can
lead to the same maximum power flow on the target line with a more sparse attack
vector.
Another problem remains to be addressed is that whether the two steps of the
worst attack strategy requires the same attack sub-graph. To this end, we exhaus-
tively compare the attack sub-graphs chosen from the two steps and the corresponding
load shifts for all the 38 attack scenarios under l1-norm constraint that range from
0.06 to 0.3. We find that for all the test cases, the attack sub-graphs determined
by the two steps and the load shifts resulting from the two steps are the same. As
stated in Section 4.2, a specific load pattern corresponds to only one optimal dispatch
plan, such results show that the initial attack vector can perfectly lead the system
operation states to the worst operation states determined in Step 1.
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Figure 4.3: Target Line #12 (Connecting Bus #8 - Bus #9) with τ = 10%.
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Figure 4.4: Target Line #13 (Connecting Bus #8 - Bus #10) with τ = 10%.
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4.4.2 Case Study of the Long-term Impact of the Attack
In this subsection, we select one typical case to demonstrate the long-term impli-
cation of the unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attack determined by
the worst attack strategy. In this case, the target line is #12. The load shift bound is
10%, NT = 1, and the l1−norm constraint is 0.06. Under this condition, the switching
attack line selected with the worst attack strategy is #2. The minimum sub-graph
determined by the worst attack strategy is shown in Figure 4.5. In this figure, the
attack sub-graph is demonstrated with red and blue where the red part is determined
by the center buses #4, #7, #8, and #10, and the blue part is to complete the
observable path for the switching attack line 2. The target line is represented with
the thick red line while the switching attack line is with the blue dash-dot line.
Figure 4.5: Sub-graph of Attack Case When Line #12 Congested and Line #2 Has
A Physical Outage within Unobservable Topology Attack.
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Figure 4.6 illustrates the cyber and physical power flow variation from Event 1 to
Event 20. The active power variation for generators at bus #7 and #13 are shown
in Figure 4.7 (the other generation remain unchanged). The load shift percentage
caused by the attack is shown in Figure 4.8. At Event 0, a physical attack is launched
on line #2. Attacker immediately perform local SE inside S and launch the initial
unobservable topology attack calculated with c0. In the following events, the attacker
sustains the attack by modifying the power flow and power injection measurements
within the attack vector calculated with c. Therefore, in the cyber layer, the power
flow on line #12 is less than 100% while in physical layer, there is an overload existing.
From Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.8, we can observe that once the active power generation
dispatch at Event 1 is moved to the solution of Step 1, the physical overflow is
maintained by injecting the same attack vector determined by Step 1. The heat
accumulation may eventually cause this line to overheat and then trip offline.
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Figure 4.6: Power Flow on Line #12 When Line #2 Has A Physical Outage within
Unobservable Topology Attack.
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When Line #2 Has An Outage and Line #12 Was Prior Congested Within Unob-
servable Topology Attack.
In Figure 4.8, we can compare the load shift calculated by the optimization prob-
lem in linear model and the actual load shift in non-linear model. It is obvious that
the load shifts determined by the optimization problem are all within the load shift
threshold 10%. And when apply the attack vector in non-linear model, the load shifts
caused by attack are also within 10%. For most buses with load shift, the non-linear
(AC) load shift percentage is comparable to linear (DC) load shift percentage.
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4.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we introduce a class of unobservable topology attacks in which
both topology data and states for a sub-graph of the network are changed by an
attacker. We proposed a two-step attack strategy to maximize the power flow on
a specific line embedded with minimizing the set of measurements compromised by
attackers. We have shown that the attack designed with the proposed two-step worst
attack strategy can cause overload in the test system within the bound of the load shift
in both linear and non-linear system models. The proportion of the successful attacks
in non-linear system model is 81.58%, which shows the vulnerability of system to such
attacks. In addition, we demonstrate the long-term consequences of such attacks and
show that if such attacks are sustained, the overload problems can be maintained
without being detected by the control center. Such overload problems can lead to the
overheat of the target line, and hence, result in the outage of the target line. Thus,
such attacks should draw the attention of control centers.
A potential countermeasure is to employ a more accurate historical data com-
parison for generation dispatch. The generation dispatch corresponding to the load
patterns mimicking by attackers can also be different from the normal load shift
patterns of such dispatch plan recorded in historical data. Once the anomalies are
determined, operator can immediately send workers to measure the line flow in field
to detect the overflow problem.
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Chapter 5
TOPOLOGY-TARGETED MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE COMMUNICATION
ATTACKS
In this chapter, we focus on a class of topology-targeted man-in-the-middle (MitM)
communication attacks aimed at limiting information sharing between adjacent areas,
particularly when one or both areas experience topology changes (e.g., line outages).
While wide-area monitoring and information sharing has been proposed by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission based on observations that lack of seamless data
sharing is an important factor in cascading failures, real-time data sharing in the
grid is still done in an ad hoc manner between connected areas. For example, in the
Northeast blackout of 2003 [1], [24], a line out in one area (Ohio) was not conveyed for
a sufficient period of time to neighboring regions leading to convergence failure of the
state estimator and other cascading problems. Furthermore, the mode, amount, and
granularity of data shared is not standardized; for example, two connected areas may
only share limited topology information such as low granularity network equivalent
models which in turn are insufficient to capture the complexity of the electric grid and
ensure wide-area reliability (e.g., the Yuma-Southern California outage of 2011 [25]).
In fact, changes in the grid topology are often communicated via human operators
and not in an automated manner which adds to communication delays and errors.
In the light of such limitations, a smart adversary can limit information sharing in
a number of ways. We seek to understand the effects of such limited data sharing
scenarios (both adversarial and otherwise) on the electric power system real-time
operations.
We introduce a class of distributed communication attacks wherein an attack on
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the Energy Management System (EMS) of one area prevents the sharing of topology
changing information with the other area (in automated systems where topology
may be shared real-time or frequently, this can be achieved via man-in-the-middle
attacks). We assume that the attacker is either involved in bringing down a line
remotely (breakers can be remotely tripped in some cases) or is aware of a line out
(again possible via presence of software trojans in the EMS). The attacker, therefore,
is assumed to have some knowledge of the network topology.
In this chapter, we focus on a distributed two-area (managed by two operators
and EMSs) setting to demonstrate the consequences of limited information sharing.
Specifically, we focus on attacks that create or exploit outages in one area and limit
information sharing via a communication attack thereby affecting the power flow so-
lutions and dispatch in a connected area that has incorrect topology information.
Specifically, we modeled the tie-lines connected the two areas under two conditions:
(a) in normal operation, the tie-line interchange is fixed according to the day-ahead
contract between areas, we simulate with only 10% variation on tie-line power flow
interchange; and (b) under contingencies, the tie-line power flow can vary any values
under the tie-line capacity, we then simulate with no tie-line interchange variation
limitation. Our results demonstrate that such an attack in a distributed power net-
work leads to a range of possibilities; these include actual physical line overloads that
are not observable from the cyber measurements but can eventually cause line over-
heating and cascading outages; false overload alert in cyber layer while the physical
system operates in normal condition; progressively severe lack of convergence of OPF
in both areas; relatively benign oscillations in the power flow solutions between the
two areas that eventually fix themselves; and line overloads in both physical can cy-
ber layers. Our time progression based attack model allows us to capture the major
computational components of EMSs including AC state estimation, optimal power
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flow (OPF) including generation dispatch, and power flow calculation unit which ad-
justing dispatch mismatch between areas. Based on our observations, we also present
countermeasures for such attacks.
5.1 System Model
We consider a two-area network model in which each area uses its measurements
to evaluate the state of the system, compute the optimal power flow, and determine
generation dispatch. It is worth noting that there are many control and actuation
functions that operate at multiple timescales in the EMS and not all of them are
captured by our model. Our choice of functions is driven by a specific time-scale that
focuses on topology processing and state estimation, power flow computation, and
generation dispatch. It is assumed that the computations are performed at a local
control center as shown in Figure 5.1, and henceforth, when we refer to the two areas
sharing information, it implies that information is exchanged between the control
centers. We make the following assumptions about the information shared between
the two areas.
5.1.1 Information Sharing Model
To illustrate the distributed effects of a communication attack, we assume that the
two areas share as much information as relevant and based on current practices. The
primary assumption is that each area performs its own computations with some data
(depending on the computation block) obtained from the other side. Our assumptions
are as follows:
• Static topology information: The static topology information is shared among
all areas of the interconnected power system.
• Dynamic topology information: Each area is assumed to communicate the topol-
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Figure 5.1: Computational Units and Data Interactions between the Two Areas of
the Network.
ogy changing information among the whole system in real-time. Thus, once a
topology error is found, the local operator should send this information to other
areas immediately, which allows them to update the whole system topology in-
formation in time.
• Generation: The generation schedule of each unit is shared among areas in
real-time.
• Measurements: The tie-line measurements are shared between adjacent areas
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in real-time. In general, more measurements can be shared but we assume that
each area does its own local state estimation (as is often the case in practice).
• Estimated load: The estimated load data is shared among areas in real-time.
• Network models for power flow: Each area computes its own AC OPF. In
practice, each area uses a network equivalent model of its connected areas to
simplify the OPF computation. However, since we seek to understand the effect
of a communication cyber-attack on dispatch and power flows (line overloads
often contribute to outages), we choose the best case network model, i.e., we
assume each area uses the complete network model of the other side in com-
puting its OPF. However, each area can only dispatch its own generators, and
thus, computes the OPF while keeping the dispatch for the other area fixed
according to the generation data sharing model.
5.1.2 Computational Models
We briefly outline the mathematical model for each of the computational units
we consider here. The different computational units and their interactions across the
two areas is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
State Estimation
Each area applies a weighted least-squares (WLS) AC state estimation as stated in
Section 2.2 to calculate its system state (complex voltages) using the measurements
from meters in its area as well as tie-line measurements.
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Power Flow Calculation
Each area uses Newton’s method to solve the power flow (PF) problem which involves
solving for the set of voltages and flows in a network corresponding to the estimated
loads and generation schedule obtained from OPF in previous time period. This unit
is to adjust the overall load and generation mismatch caused by joint dispatch of two
areas.
Optimal Power Flow
Assuming perfect network equivalent models (i.e., complete sharing of neighboring
network graphs for OPF), area i, i = 1, 2, runs its OPF with the dispatch for area j,
fixed around values that were shared from the previous time period that area j ran
its own OPF. The resulting OPF problem can be viewed as each area performing a
centralized power flow problem but with the capability to only dispatch local units.
Let B and Br denote the set of buses and branches in the entire two-area network,
and Bi and Bj denote the set of buses in area i, i = 1, 2, and area j, j = 1, 2, j 6= i,
respectively. Futhermore, let Gn denotes the set of generators at bus n, {Gn}n∈Bi
denotes the set of generators in area i, i = 1, 2. Let cg (·) to denote the generation cost
function for generator g. The OPF for each area can be formulated as the following
optimization problem for area i, i = 1, 2:
min
∑
g∈{Gn}n∈Bi
cg (Pg) (5.1)
s.t.
∑
Pg +
∑
Pk−
∀k(n,;)
∑
Pk
∀k(;,n)
= Pdn, ∀n ∈ B, (5.2)
∑
Qg
g∈Gn
+
∑
Qk−
∀k(n,;)
∑
Qk
∀k(;,n)
= Qdn, ∀n ∈ B, (5.3)
Pk = V
2
n (gsn + gnm)− VnVm(gnmcos(θn − θm) (5.4)
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+bnmsin(θn − θm)), k ∈ Br
Qk = −V 2n (bsn + bnm)− VnVm(gnmsin(θn − θm) (5.5)
−bnmcos(θn − θm)), k ∈ Br
P 2k +Q
2
k ≤ (Smaxk )2 ∀k ∈ Br (5.6)
Pming ≤ Pg ≤ Pmaxg ∀g ∈ {Gn}n∈Bi (5.7)
Qming ≤ Qg ≤ Qmaxg ∀g ∈ {Gn}n∈Bi (5.8)
V minn ≤ Vn ≤ V maxn x ∈ {θ, V } ,∀n ∈ B (5.9)
Pˆg −4P¯g 6 Pg 6 Pˆg +4P¯g ∀g ∈ {Gn}n∈Bj (5.10)
Qˆg −4Q¯g 6 Qg 6 Qˆg +4Q¯g∀g ∈ {Gn}n∈Bj (5.11)
where cg(.) is the cost function for generator g, bnm and gnm are the susceptance and
conductance, respectively, of line k from bus n to bus m, bsn and gsn are the shunt
branch susceptance and conductance, respectively, of bus n, k(n, ; ) is the set of lines
k with bus n as its receiving bus, and k(; , n) is the set of lines k with bus n as its
sending bus, Gn is the set of generators at bus n, Pg is the active power output of
generator g with maximum and minimum limit Pmaxg and P
min
g , Qg is the reactive
power output of generator g with maximum and minimum limit Qmaxg and Q
min
g , Pˆgj
and Qˆgj are the fixed active and reactive power outputs with4P¯g and4Q¯g deviations
of generator g in area j, respectively, Pk and Qk are the active and reactive power
flows, respectively, on line k with line capacity limit Smaxk , Pdn and Qdn are the active
and reactive power demands, respectively, at bus n, θn is the voltage angle for bus n,
and Vn is the voltage magnitude for bus n with maximum and minimum limits V
max
n
and V minn , respectively.
The objective in (5.1) is to minimize the total active power generation cost of
the whole interconnected power system. Constraints (5.2) and (5.3) represent the
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active and reactive power balance for each bus in the centralized system (two-area
network). The constraints in (5.4) and (5.5) are the active and reactive transmission
line power flow constraints for the whole system while (5.6) is the thermal limit for
each transmission line. Constraints (5.7) and (5.8) are the local (for area i only)
unit active and reactive power output limits while (5.9) defines the complex voltage
stability limits for each bus in the whole system. Finally, (5.10) and (5.11) incorporate
the unit active and reactive power output limits for area j, j 6= i, i.e., the power output
of generation units external to area i are fixed around the values shared by the other
areas.
When no feasible solution (i.e., a solution which satisfies (5.2)-(5.11)) can be
found, the distributed OPF program fails to converge. In practice, to find a feasible
solution, system operators often relax the constraints. In this report, the thermal
limit constraint on the congested line is the first constraint to be relaxed. Multiple
iterations of relaxing the line limits may be needed to obtain a feasible solution; to
this end, we model the relaxed limits as follows:
P 2k +Q
2
k ≤ (Smaxk + u4S¯k)2
where line k is the congested line, 4S¯k is the incremental value by which the line
limit is relaxed in each iteration, and u 6 umax is the iteration number. In each
iteration, the thermal limit is relaxed by increasing the rating of line k by, and the
OPF program is executed to check whether it converges. This process is repeated
until the OPF program converges or the relaxation time reaches its maximum value.
Following this, other important lines (such as those with high reactive power flow)
will be relaxed using the same procedure. If both methods fail to work, then we
consider the test case as a not converge case.
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5.2 Attacker Model
5.2.1 Time Progression Model of Attack
We assume that the attacker has access to the data being shared between areas and
can corrupt the data. Examples abound of such data corruption attacks including
the oft cited Stuxnet virus attack. The attacker is assumed to either participate
in creating a line outage in one area or be aware of such an outage and then act
to corrupt the topology information shared with the other area. Our attack model
also captures simple human errors in information sharing between connected areas,
including delays and mis-communications. In the interest of understanding worst-case
attacks and data sharing limitations, the area with the outage is assumed to be aware
of the outage shortly after. This assumption is based on frequently seen patterns of
limited data sharing that precede (and are a cause of) large blackouts.
In order to understand the effect of such an attack, we study the time progression
of the attack. We consider the following time-progression of the attack and system
behavior includes the following steps:
1. Event 0: Area i: Outage occurs in Area i, i = 1, 2. Area i becomes aware of
outage and updates its topology and shares with Area j. Area i then performs
SE, PF, and OPF.
2. Event 0: Attack : Attacker replaces updated topology information shared with
area j, j 6= i, j = 1, 2, with the previous static topology information.
3. Event 0: Area j : Area j uses measurements with updated topology (which has
been changed by attacker) to compute SE, PF, and OPF.
4. Event 1: System: Area i and Area j jointly dispatch according to their own
OPF results.
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Figure 5.2: Time Sequence of Events at the Two Areas at the Time of and Following
An Attack in One Area.
5. Event 1: Area i: Area i uses measurements with updated topology to compute
SE, PF, and OPF. Shares dispatch status with Area j. Attacker sustains attack.
6. Event 1: Area j: Area j uses measurements with updated topology (which has
been changed by attacker) to compute SE, PF, and OPF. Shares dispatch status
with Area i.
7. Events repeat until alarms are set off either due to repeated lack of convergence
or physical line overloads. All the while it is assumed that the attacker sustains
the attack.
We illustrate this time sequence in Fig 5.2 for the case in which Area 1 experiences a
line outage while Area 2 does not have the real-time topology information following
the outage due to a communication attack.
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5.2.2 Tie-line Agreement Assumption
In real-time operation, the tie-line interchange is fixed according to the day-ahead
contract between areas. Therefore, under normal operation condition, the tie-line
interchange should be fixed with only a small variation. However, under contingencies,
the highest priority is to fix the violation. Therefore, the tie-line power flow can
vary up to the tie-line capacity. In this chapter, we model the system under both
normal and contingency conditions. We first assume the attack is launched under
normal condition. Under this condition, there are interchange agreement values on
the tie-lines that are generally smaller than the tie-line capacities. In this model,
the tie-line interchange values are allowed to vary only 10% variation of the original
interchange agreement values. We then model the system under contingency with
tie-line interchange varying up to the tie-line capacity. The simulation results for
both system models are demonstrated in Section 5.3.
5.3 Illustration of Results
In this section, we illustrate our distributed communication attack and its conse-
quences. We consider an IEEE 24-bus reliable test system (RTS) and decompose it
into two areas (henceforth referred to as Areas 1 and 2) as shown in Figure 5.3 (the
dashed red line separates the two areas) such that Area 1 and Area 2 are connected by
four tie lines. Each area is assumed to have its own local control center that performs
local SE with local measurements and tie-line power flow measurements shared from
adjacent areas, following which it shares its estimated load information with the other
area. This is followed by a PF calculation unit to make up for the load and gener-
ation mismatch caused by joint dispatch and then an OPF re-dispatch keeping the
generator outputs external of the other area fixed. This process alternates between
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Area 1
Area 2
Figure 5.3: An IEEE RTS 24-bus Divided into Two Areas (Separated by Red Dashed
Line).
the two areas every t time units (see Figure 5.2).
The attack is modeled as a line outage in one area (e.g., line 6 in Area 1). In order
to understand the worst-case effect of the attack, the area without knowledge of the
outage is assumed to have a congested line prior to the attack. The attacker, aware of
this outage in one area, compromises the topology changing communication signals
such that the same static topology prior to the attack is shared. All possible choices of
line outages in one area and congested lines in the other are considered exhaustively
to demonstrate the effect of the possible attack cases. The system behavior is followed
over 20t time units following the outage and over this time the two areas perform SE,
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PF, OPF, and dispatch. The events sequence when Area 1 has an outage and Area 2
is affected by the communication attack is shown in Figure 5.2. The time immediately
after topology changing is assumed as Event 0. The attacker launches a MitM attack
to block the topology changing data sharing between Area 1 and Area 2 at Event
0 and sustains such an attack during the following events. Therefore, the two areas
continue re-dispatching together in the simulation time period with one area (Area
1) using correct topology to obtain optimal dispatch plan while the other (Area 2)
using false topology to do so.
In this chapter, we focus on worst-case attacks. We assume that the area without
real-time topology information has some lines at capacity, i.e., congested. This is
achieved in simulation by reducing the line rating to 90% of the base case power flow
to create congestion. We first model the system under tight tie-line agreement, in
which only 10% variation on tie-line power flow interchange is allowed, then we model
the system under contingencies, in which no tie-line interchange limit is modeled. To
demonstrate our simulation, we first document our results in tables and then provide
the detailed analysis and plots for both tie-line agreement cases.
Table 5.1: System Behavior with Sustained Attack for IEEE 24-bus System When
Tie-line Interchange Is Fixed with 10% Variation.
Feasible
Case
Physical PF
Overload
Cyber PF
Overload
Not
Converge
No Violation
Case
Cyber-
Physical PF
Overload
540 24.82% 14.26% 30.00% 23.33% 7.59%
*PF: Power flow
Table 5.1 shows the numbers in percentage of the five possible long term (20 or
more events) outcomes of an attack after Event 0 with tie-line interchange fixed.
These attack consequences are quantified by comparing the cyber power flow and
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physical power flow in the area without the real-time topology (say Area 2) over the
entire attack time duration. The cyber power flow is the OPF solution calculated
by the control center in Area 2 with fixed external generation. The physical power
flow, on the other hand, is the real power flow values of the system after dispatching
with the most recent OPF dispatch solution with the true topology information.
Therefore, for the area with false topology information, the cyber power flow values
will be different from the physical power flow values. Five kinds of disparities are
observed between the cyber and physical power flows following Event 0; we name
them physical PF Overload, cyber PF overload, Not converge, No violation case, and
cyber-physical PF overload case. We describe these disparities in detail below.
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Figure 5.4: Physical PF Overload Case: Power Flow on Prior Congested Line #24
(area 2) When Line #3 (Area 1) Is Outaged.
Physical PF (power flow) Overload cases: For area with false topology in these
cases, there is a mismatch between the cyber and physical power flows due to the
false topology. Monitoring the cyber power flow cannot reflect the severity of the
physical overload. The physical power flow on the previous congested line overloads
during the simulation time period. However, such overload problem is not shown or
attenuated in cyber layer. A typical physical PF overload case (Line 3 connecting
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Bus 1 to Bus 5 is outaged with Line 24 connecting Bus 15 to Bus 16 congested) plot
is shown in Figure 5.4. For these cases, the prior congested lines can get heated due
to the dispatch of the area with false topology information. The heat accumulation
may eventually cause the line to overheat and trip offline. Therefore, these cases can
be viewed as successful attack outcomes.
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Figure 5.5: Cyber PF Overload Violation Case: Power Flow on Prior Congested
Line #29 (Area 2) When Line #18 (Area 1) Is Outaged.
Cyber PF Overload cases: For area with false topology in these cases, the cyber
power flow is shown as overload during the simulation time period while in the physical
layer, there is no overload happened. A typical cyber PF overload case (Line 18
connecting Bus 11 to Bus 14 is outaged with Line 29 connecting Bus 16 to Bus 19
congested) plot is shown in Figure 5.5. For these cases, the incorrect cyber overload
alert can lead to wrong contingency behaviors such as throttling up other nearby
sources, load shedding, or even worse, tripping transmission line or generators. We
hence, view such cases as successful attack outcomes.
Not Converge cases: In these cases, the physical power flow overload happens
in the first few events but eventually the OPF program fails obtain a dispatch plan
for one or both areas. This is because for a fixed power generation from one area,
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there is no local dispatch plan that can satisfy all the constraints of the system even
with thermal limit relaxation. In some cases, to clear the contingencies require more
interchange between areas. Without the generator output changing jointly on both
sides, the local center cannot find a feasible solution to solve the existing overload
or stability problem. The worse operation states will continue until more serious
consequences happened. Therefore, such cases can also be viewed as successful attack
outcomes.
No violation case: For these cases, there is no overload immediately after Event 0
or a line overloaded after Event 0 can finally reduce below 100% of the rating in the
simulation time period. Though the re-dispatch plan of the area with false topology
still give a wrong calculation values of the system, no further problem caused by the
wrong plan. We, therefore, view the attacks leading to such cases as unsuccessful
attacks.
Cyber-physical PF Overload cases: In these cases, despite there are overloads
in physical layer, there is no mismatch between the physical and cyber power flow.
Therefore, the control center can be aware of the overload problems and fix such
problems in time. This class of cases is then viewed as unsuccessful attack outcomes.
We observe a total of 373 successful attack cases, i.e., 69.08% of the total attack
cases. We define the subclass of successful attacks for which the power flow of 105%
relative to the flow following Event 0 as critical (successful) attacks, and note that
the total number of critical attacks for the RTS system is 60, which is 11.11% of
the total attack cases. These results demonstrate the potential vulnerability of a
topology-based communication attack.
The statisics results of the long term outcomes of an attack after Event 0 without
tie-line interchange limit is demonstrated in Table 5.2. Under such tie-line interchange
model, we also observe the five disparities which are physical PF Overload, cyber PF
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Table 5.2: System Behavior with Sustained Attack for IEEE 24-bus System without
Tie-line Interchange Limitation.
Feasible
Case
Physical PF
Overload
Cyber PF
Overload
Not
Converge
No Violation
Case
Cyber-
Physical PF
Overload
540 35.74% 23.15% 6.11% 26.48% 8.52%
*PF: Power flow
overload, Not converge, No violation case, and cyber-physical PF overload case as
introduced above. The proportion of successful attack cases is 65% of the total attack
cases and that of the critical attack cases is 9.81% of the total attack cases. We can
observe that with no tie-line interchange limitation, the number of not converge cases
are largely reduced. However, such converged cases become physical PF overload
cases or cyber overload cases. Hence, the proportion of the total successful attack
cases are not changed too much.
Comparing the simulation results in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, we can see that even
under no tie-line interchange limitation, the MitM attacks can still lead to systematic
problems and failures. Thus, the system is vulnerable to a topology-based com-
munication attack under both tie-line interchange fixed condition and contingency
condition. System operator should pay attention to such class of attacks.
5.4 Countermeasures and Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we introduce a new class of distributed MitM attacks specifically
targeting the topology sharing data between connected areas in the electric grid. We
have demonstrated the time consequences of such attacks and have shown that such
attacks can often lead to serious consequences if active intervention is not present. In
this context, we observe that in addition to the traditional countermeasure of human
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operator-based data sharing (which have been shown to be error-prone and delayed
too), it is essential to have more resiliency via automated data sharing mechanisms.
Our attack is successful because the two areas process data largely independently
except for data sharing and do not employ sanity checks for data from the other side
or a more interactive distributed processing platform. This could help both areas
become aware of inconsistencies over faster time-scales including: (a) create and
share a list of external contingencies caused to other areas by an internal component
outage; (b) identify the anormalies of such attacks and enable machine learning in
EMS to detect such attacks. It is worth noting that, while some of these mechanisms
are being considered or even used currently in the grid, it is not done in a uniform
manner and this work highlights the limitations of not doing so.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, three classes of cyber attacks that target on changing topology
information at cyber layer are introduced. For each class of attacks, the attack model
is proposed; the local information required to implement attacks is identified; the
long-term consequences of attacks are demonstrated via IEEE 24-bus system. The
major conclusions are drawn as follows:
• The implementation of unobservable state-preserving topology attacks, espe-
cially the line-maintaining attacks is studied in this thesis. An algorithm based
on BFS is proposed to search for the minimum set of local information required
to perform such attacks. The proposed algorithm can enable an attacker to
obtain the localized topology and corresponding measurement data to mount
an attack that bypasses bad data detector and successfully changes topology
information of the system in the cyber layer. However, three categories of
limitations of these attacks are identified including: (a) the choice of feasible
switching attack lines is limited; (b) most of such attacks can lead to large load
shifts in cyber layer, which can be detected by operators; and (c) the num-
ber of successful attacks that can lead to severe long-term violations is small.
Therefore, countermeasures such as load monitoring, and checks on anomalous
re-dispatches can be used to detect such attacks
• Since state-preserving topology attacks requires a large amount of load shifts
that can be detected, thus, an intelligent attacker will naturally consider a new
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class of attacks that involves changing both topology and states. Therefore,
such attacks should be fully understood by system operators. To this end, a
class of unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attacks is modeled and
studied. A two-step worst-attack optimization problem is developed to study
the long-term consequences of worst-case attacks. Attacks resulting from the
optimization can maximize power flow on a specific line with limited access
to only a set of topology and measurement data while masking the physical
attack. Our observations include: (a) attacks designed with the worst attack
strategy can cause overflow; (b) the load shifts resulting from such attacks
are within setting bounds; and (c) If such attacks are sustained, the overflow
on the target line can be maintained without being detected by the control
center, thus, making the power system vulnerable to this attack class. System
operators should pay more attention to such unobservable topology attacks.
Two viable countermeasures are using valid historical data comparison to detect
(i) anomalous load shifts in a subset of network, and (ii) anomalous generation
dispatch.
• A class of topology-targeted man-in-the-middle communication attacks that
that alter topology data shared during inter-EMS communication is studied in
this thesis. We have demonstrated the time consequences of such attacks and
have shown that such attacks can often lead to serious consequences if active
intervention is not present. Countermeasures including anomalous tie-line in-
terchange verification, anomalous re-dispatch alarms, and external contingency
lists sharing are needed to thwart such attacks.
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6.2 Future Work
To further study the implications of topology attacks on power system operation,
the following work is suggested for the future.
For the unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attacks, the worst attack
optimization problems can be formulated with subset of the network and the marginal
units of the system. In fact, it is not realistic for attackers to know the whole network
topology and the costs, capacity, and operation status of all generators in the system.
Moreover, modeling a two-stage optimization problem for attacks in a large electric
power system (e.g., the PJM system which includes 15000 buses, 2800 generators and
20000 branches) requires a large set of variables and parameters; thus, it may be in
the attacker’s interest to design an local attack with significant local consequences
as a first step. From the simulation results of Chapter 4, we can also observe that
for most of the attacks, only a few set of marginal generators are influenced by
attacks. Therefore, system operators should understand a class of relatively worse
attack scenarios modeled in a localized network with only marginal generations. The
consequences of such attacks should be fully studied as the first step to thwart such
attacks.
We define the set of topology information that attacker can obtain as an attack
internal network and the rest as the attack external network. The first step is to
analyze the target line, figuring out the marginal units that can reduce or worsen
congestion on this line. For marginal units inside the internal network, the node
balance constraints and generation capacity constraints are unchanged at the second
stage of the optimization problem (modeling DC OPF). The incremental output of
each external marginal generator can be replaced by equivalent incremental power
injections on all the boundary buses that can be computed with PTDF and the
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total incremental output of the generator. Then for each boundary bus, the sum of
power flows in the branches of the external network can be replaced with a pseudo-
injection. The modification of the problem is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The modified
second stage DC OPF for the worst attack with localized information is
{
θI∗,P I∗G ,4PEM∗G , P I∗K
}
= arg
{
min
θ,PG,PK
ng∑
g∈Gin
Cg
(
P IGg
)
+
ng∑
g∈Gex
Cg
(4PEMGg )
}
s.t. AIGNP
I
G − AIKNP IK = P ID (λI) (6.1)
ABGNP
I
G − ABKNP IK = PBD + PBInj + PTDFMarB · 4PEMG (λB) (6.2)
−P ImaxK 6H¯I2
(
θI + θIc
)
6P ImaxK (µ−, µ+) (6.3)
P IminG 6 P IG 6 P ImaxG (α−, α+) (6.4)
P IK = diag
(
sI
) · H¯I2θI (6.5)
where the superscript I denotes the set of internal elements (e.g., bus, branch, and
generator), the superscript B denotes the set of boundary buses, the superscript EM
denotes the set of marginal generators in external network, PTDFMarB represent the
PTDF matrix to which the from the buses where the marginal generators in the
external network are connected to the boundary buses of the attack internal network,
the variable PBInj is the pseudo-injection vector for the boundary buses which equal
to the sum of power flow injected into the boundary buses from the attack external
network.
Another extension is to model the sequential line-switching attacks in the worst
attack strategy. In this problem, attacker can determine multiple physical lines to trip
in sequence with multiple-stage optimization problem. The objective of the attack
can also be extended to multiple target lines in which the power flow are maximized.
The system stability within such attacks should also be studied.
Finally, machine learning on system anomalies detection could further be applied
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of Worst-case Attack Optimization within Local Network
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to thwart the topology attacks on system operations.
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